Between Faith and Tribute: Re-Examining Qur’an 9:29 in Context
By the late 20th century, a new and terrifying image of the Muslim state had been seared into the global consciousness—a polity defined by a divine mandate for perpetual religious war. The cornerstone of this constructed identity, endlessly repeated in online forums, counter-terrorism briefings, and the sermons of extremists themselves, is a single, severe Quranic command. It is a verse crisp and uncompromising in its demand: to “fight those who do not believe in God nor the Last Day” until they “give the jizya from their hand, being subdued.” For its proponents, Qur’an 9:29 is the ultimate proof text, the divine sanction for a system of institutionalized humiliation and eternal jihad against non-believers. For its detractors, it is the smoking gun that confirms the faith’s inherent imperialist and discriminatory nature.
Its implications, as presented, are profound; the jizya, they claim, was a brutal tool of subjugation designed to force conversion or impoverishment. But this modern, weaponized interpretation of the “Verse of Tribute” did not emerge from the complex, treaty-based statecraft of the 7th-century Caliphate, but from the ideological factories of the 21st century, where both Islamophobes and Salafi-jihadists found a common interest in ripping it from the body of its historical application. They draw, crucially, on the same hermeneutical violence they purport to condemn—isolating a single, legal principle from the intricate fiscal, legal, and moral system it was meant to inaugurate.
The farther back one peers into the sources—into the papyrus treaties of Tabuk, the tax registers of Abu Bakr, and the centralized reforms of Umar ibn al-Khattab—the more the modern myth of a purely oppressive jizya disintegrates. In its place, we find a pragmatic and principled instrument of statecraft, a flexible poll tax that was one half of a sacred covenant (dhimma). The early Muslim community understood it not as a license for persecution, but as the fiscal cornerstone of a pluralistic empire, a fixed payment that purchased tangible protections, exempted from military service, and varied from one gold dinar for a Syrian farmer to its silver equivalent for an Iraqi artisan, scaled according to wealth.
This blog post will trace the genealogy of this modern polemical fiction. It will contrast the Caliphate’s own coherent, meticulously recorded fiscal history—with its standardized rates, its in-kind payments of wheat and oil, and its explicit exemptions for the poor—with the simplistic, ahistorical claims of its detractors and hijackers. It will demonstrate how a verse establishing a limited legal category was twisted into a universal manifesto of religious apartheid. Above all, it will defend the primacy of context (سِيَاق), historical application (التَّطْبِيق التَّارِيخِي), and scholarly consensus (إِجْمَاع)—principles that demand a text be understood through the lived reality of the community that first implemented it, not weaponized in its most isolated and decontextualized form.
This is the story of a verse of statecraft maligned, a prophetic model of pluralism distorted, and a truth that the papyrus receipts and imperial ledgers have been shouting all along, for those willing to look.
📖 The Divine Blueprint: Qur’an 9:29 in Its Revelatory Context
The modern debate over jizya begins and ends with a single, stark verse, often presented in terrifying isolation. To understand its true meaning, we must first restore its original literary and historical setting. Qur’an 9:29 was not revealed in a vacuum; it is part of a coherent passage (Qur’an 9:28-33) that moves from a specific prohibition to a universal theological claim, with the ruling on jizya acting as the pivotal link between the two.
When we examine the full page, a far more complex and conditional message emerges—one that the early Muslim state understood not as a blanket command for war, but as a legal foundation for a very specific, regulated political relationship.
The modern debate over jizya begins and ends with a single, stark verse, often presented in terrifying isolation. To understand its true meaning, we must first restore its original literary and historical setting. Qur’an 9:29 was not revealed in a vacuum; it is part of a coherent passage (Qur’an 9:28-33) that moves from a specific prohibition to a universal theological claim, with the ruling on jizya acting as the pivotal link between the two.
When we examine the full page, a far more complex and conditional message emerges—one that the early Muslim state understood not as a blanket command for war, but as a legal foundation for a very specific, regulated political relationship.
🕋 I. The Sanctuary Purified: The Contextual Gateway to Jizya (Qur'an 9:28)
Before the command to fight is ever mentioned, the Qur'an establishes a principle of sacred space and divine providence. Verse 9:28 is not an isolated declaration of impurity; it is the critical first step in a logical and theological argument that culminates in the ruling on jizya. It addresses the immediate, practical anxieties of the Muslim community to set the stage for a new political and economic reality.
📖 The Verse and Its Core Message
الآيَة: يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنَّمَا الْمُشْرِكُونَ نَجَسٌ فَلَا يَقْرَبُوا الْمَسْجِدَ الْحَرَامَ بَعْدَ عَامِهِمْ هَٰذَا ۚ وَإِنْ خِفْتُمْ عَيْلَةً فَسَوْفَ يُغْنِيكُمُ اللَّهُ مِن فَضْلِهِ إِن شَاءَ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلِيمٌ حَكِيمٌ
Translation:
"O you who have believed, indeed the polytheists are unclean, so let them not approach al-Masjid al-Ḥarām after this, their year. And if you fear poverty, Allah will enrich you from His bounty if He wills. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Wise."
🧼 Unpacking "Unclean" (نَجَسٌ): A Spectrum of Classical Opinions
The classical commentators (mufassirūn) did not hold a single, monolithic view on the meaning of "unclean." Their opinions, recorded by al-Ṭabarī and al-Baghawī, reveal a nuanced understanding focused on legal status and ritual purity, not inherent human value.
👨⚖️ Commentator / Source 💬 Opinion on "نَجَس" (Unclean) 🧭 Type of Impurity / Rationale Al-Ṭabarī (via Qatādah) "أَجْنَابٌ" (In a state of major ritual impurity - Junub)
They are junub and do not perform the major ritual ablution (ghusl). 💦 Ritual Impurity: Based on the state of their bodies due to non-observance of Islamic purity laws. Al-Baghawī (via Ḍaḥḥāk & Abū 'Ubaydah) "قَذْر" (Filthy/Dirty) 🧹 Metaphorical/Moral Impurity: A description of their spiritual state, warranting their exclusion from a sacred space. Al-Baghawī (Summary) "نجاسة الحكم لا نجاسة العين"
(An impurity of legal ruling, not an intrinsic impurity) ⚖️ Legal Impurity: A crucial distinction. They are deemed "unclean" in the context of the law, not that their physical bodies are inherently filthy. This is a status, not an essence.
⚖️ The Verdict: The dominant scholarly opinion leans towards legal and ritual impurity. This is not a statement about the biological nature of polytheists but a legal designation that bars them from the sacred precinct, much like a person in a state of janabah is barred from prayer. This is a specific ruling for a specific context.
| 👨⚖️ Commentator / Source | 💬 Opinion on "نَجَس" (Unclean) | 🧭 Type of Impurity / Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Al-Ṭabarī (via Qatādah) | "أَجْنَابٌ" (In a state of major ritual impurity - Junub) They are junub and do not perform the major ritual ablution (ghusl). | 💦 Ritual Impurity: Based on the state of their bodies due to non-observance of Islamic purity laws. |
| Al-Baghawī (via Ḍaḥḥāk & Abū 'Ubaydah) | "قَذْر" (Filthy/Dirty) | 🧹 Metaphorical/Moral Impurity: A description of their spiritual state, warranting their exclusion from a sacred space. |
| Al-Baghawī (Summary) | "نجاسة الحكم لا نجاسة العين" (An impurity of legal ruling, not an intrinsic impurity) | ⚖️ Legal Impurity: A crucial distinction. They are deemed "unclean" in the context of the law, not that their physical bodies are inherently filthy. This is a status, not an essence. |
⚖️ The Verdict: The dominant scholarly opinion leans towards legal and ritual impurity. This is not a statement about the biological nature of polytheists but a legal designation that bars them from the sacred precinct, much like a person in a state of janabah is barred from prayer. This is a specific ruling for a specific context.
🗓️ The Specificity of the Command: "After this, their year"
The ruling is not eternal from the moment of revelation; it is prospective and time-bound.
📅 The Year: As cited by al-Ṭabarī from Qatādah and others, this was the year 9 AH (630 CE), the year of the Farewell Pilgrimage led by Abu Bakr and the proclamation of the immunity by ʿAlī.
🎯 The Scope: The ban is exclusively for المُشْرِكُونَ (Polytheists), not all non-Muslims. As al-Baghawī clarifies, this ruling created a hierarchy of sacred spaces in Islam:
🕋 Al-Masjid al-Ḥarām (The Sanctuary): Forbidden to all non-Muslims.
🏜️ The Ḥijāz (Arabian Peninsula): Non-Muslims cannot reside permanently.
🌍 Other Muslim Lands: Non-Muslims (Dhimmis) can live and even enter mosques with permission.
📅 The Year: As cited by al-Ṭabarī from Qatādah and others, this was the year 9 AH (630 CE), the year of the Farewell Pilgrimage led by Abu Bakr and the proclamation of the immunity by ʿAlī.
🎯 The Scope: The ban is exclusively for المُشْرِكُونَ (Polytheists), not all non-Muslims. As al-Baghawī clarifies, this ruling created a hierarchy of sacred spaces in Islam:
🕋 Al-Masjid al-Ḥarām (The Sanctuary): Forbidden to all non-Muslims.
🏜️ The Ḥijāz (Arabian Peninsula): Non-Muslims cannot reside permanently.
🌍 Other Muslim Lands: Non-Muslims (Dhimmis) can live and even enter mosques with permission.
💰 The Economic Anxiety and Divine Promise: "If you fear poverty..."
This is the linchpin that connects Verse 28 to Verse 29. The early Muslims had a legitimate economic concern.
👥 The Community's Fear (as per al-Ṭabarī's Sources) 🤲 Allah's Promise of "Enrichment" (as interpreted by the Mufassirūn) ➡️ "They said: 'Where will our food come from? Who will bring us goods?'" (Ibn ʿAbbās)
➡️ "We used to gain from their trade and sales!" (ʿAṭiyyah al-ʿAwfī)
➡️ "Our livelihoods were from their commerce!" (Mujāhid) 1. 🌧️ Direct Providence: Ikrimah said: "Allah enriched them by sending down plentiful rain."
2. 🛒 New Trade Routes: Muqātil said: "The people of Jeddah, Ṣanʿāʾ... became Muslim and brought abundant provisions to Mecca."
3. 💸 THE JIZYA: This is the primary interpretation.
Al-Ṭabarī (via Qatādah): "فأغناهم بهذا الخراج، الجزيةَ الجاريةَ عليهم" ("He enriched them with this tribute, the jizya flowing to them.")
Al-Ṭabarī (via Ibn Isḥāq): "فعوَّضهم الله... ما أعطَاهم من أعْناق أهلِ الكتاب من الجزية" ("So Allah compensated them... with what He gave them from the necks of the People of the Book in jizya.")
| 👥 The Community's Fear (as per al-Ṭabarī's Sources) | 🤲 Allah's Promise of "Enrichment" (as interpreted by the Mufassirūn) |
|---|---|
| ➡️ "They said: 'Where will our food come from? Who will bring us goods?'" (Ibn ʿAbbās) ➡️ "We used to gain from their trade and sales!" (ʿAṭiyyah al-ʿAwfī) ➡️ "Our livelihoods were from their commerce!" (Mujāhid) | 1. 🌧️ Direct Providence: Ikrimah said: "Allah enriched them by sending down plentiful rain." 2. 🛒 New Trade Routes: Muqātil said: "The people of Jeddah, Ṣanʿāʾ... became Muslim and brought abundant provisions to Mecca." 3. 💸 THE JIZYA: This is the primary interpretation. Al-Ṭabarī (via Qatādah): "فأغناهم بهذا الخراج، الجزيةَ الجاريةَ عليهم" ("He enriched them with this tribute, the jizya flowing to them.") Al-Ṭabarī (via Ibn Isḥāq): "فعوَّضهم الله... ما أعطَاهم من أعْناق أهلِ الكتاب من الجزية" ("So Allah compensated them... with what He gave them from the necks of the People of the Book in jizya.") |
🔗 The Logical Flow to Jizya (Verse 29)
The sequence is not arbitrary; it is a masterful rhetorical and legal construction.
1. 🚫 A Problem is Created: The ban on polytheists from the sanctuary threatens a key economic pipeline for the Muslim community in Mecca.2. 🤲 A Promise is Made: Allah directly addresses their anxiety and promises enrichment from His bounty.3. ⚔️ The Solution is Revealed: The very next verse (9:29) provides the practical mechanism for this enrichment: the jizya from the People of the Book.💡 The Conclusion of the Scholars: The classical commentators unanimously saw Verses 28 and 29 as a single, cohesive unit. The jizya was not merely a command to fight; it was the divinely ordained economic substitute for the lost trade with the Meccan polytheists. It was God fulfilling His promise to provide from His bounty, transforming the community's economic base from trade with idolaters to tribute from a new, regulated relationship with the People of the Book.
Thus, the "Verse of Jizya" is revealed not in a vacuum of aggression, but in a context of divine care and economic reorientation, laying the groundwork for the systematic, treaty-based fiscal state we have documented from history.
The sequence is not arbitrary; it is a masterful rhetorical and legal construction.
💡 The Conclusion of the Scholars: The classical commentators unanimously saw Verses 28 and 29 as a single, cohesive unit. The jizya was not merely a command to fight; it was the divinely ordained economic substitute for the lost trade with the Meccan polytheists. It was God fulfilling His promise to provide from His bounty, transforming the community's economic base from trade with idolaters to tribute from a new, regulated relationship with the People of the Book.
Thus, the "Verse of Jizya" is revealed not in a vacuum of aggression, but in a context of divine care and economic reorientation, laying the groundwork for the systematic, treaty-based fiscal state we have documented from history.
⚔️ II. The Command Itself: Deconstructing Qur'an 9:29
The command in verse 9:29 is dense with legal qualifiers. A phrase-by-phrase analysis reveals a targeted ruling, not a blanket declaration of war. The classical commentators acknowledged a spectrum of opinions, but only one is vindicated by the historical record of the Rashidun Caliphate.
📖 The Verse and Its Components
الآيَة: قَاتِلُوا الَّذِينَ لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَلَا بِالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وَلَا يُحَرِّمُونَ مَا حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ وَلَا يَدِينُونَ دِينَ الْحَقِّ مِنَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ حَتَّىٰ يُعْطُوا الْجِزْيَةَ عَن يَدٍ وَهُمْ صَاغِرُونَ
Translation:
"Fight those who do not believe in God nor the Last Day and do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden and do not adhere to the religion of truth from among those who were given the Scripture until they give the jizya from [their] hand while they are humbled."
🔍 1. The Target: A Specific, Belligerent Subset
The verse meticulously defines whom to fight, crucially narrowing the scope from "all non-Muslims." It uses a precise grammatical structure and a list of specific crimes to define a subset of the People of the Book who are in a state of active, ideological belligerence.
📖 The Grammatical Key: The Restrictive Particle "Min" (مِن)
The verse states: مِنَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ"From among those who were given the Scripture."This use of مِن (min) is critical. It is a partitive particle, meaning "from among" or "some of." It does not mean "all of." The command is to fight a specific, qualified group drawn from the larger category of the People of the Book.
🎯 The Four-Part Casus Belli: Defining the "Belligerent Subset"
The verse does not command fighting against People of the Book simply for being Jewish or Christian. It lists four conditions that, combined, define a state of hostile opposition.
# 📜 Condition in the Verse 🧠 Classical Interpretation & Meaning 1 لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ
"Do not believe in God" Al-Baghawī resolves the apparent contradiction: "If it is said: 'The People of the Book do believe in God and the Last Day?' It is said: They do not believe like the belief of the believers, for when they say 'Uzayr is the son of God' and 'the Messiah is the son of God,' that is not belief in God." This refers to a theological war—a specific type of disbelief that violates core Islamic monotheism. 2 وَلَا بِالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ
"Nor in the Last Day" Al-Ṭabarī explains this means "they do not affirm Paradise or Hell," indicating a rejection of the Islamic eschatological framework and its moral consequences. 3 وَلَا يُحَرِّمُونَ مَا حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ
"Nor do they forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden" This establishes a moral and legal war. They actively permit what Islam holds to be morally repugnant, setting their own law against the Sharia. 4 وَلَا يَدِينُونَ دِينَ الْحَقِّ
"Nor do they follow the religion of truth" Al-Baghawī (via Qatādah): "Truth is God, meaning: they do not follow the religion of God, and His religion is Islam."
Al-Ṭabarī: "They do not obey God with the obedience of the people of Islam." This is the culmination: a rejection of Islamic sovereignty and a refusal to submit to its political and religious authority.
⚔️ The Combined Effect: A person or polity is only a target if they meet all four conditions. This describes a group in a state of total ideological and political belligerence—one that rejects Islamic theology, morality, and sovereignty. It is a declaration of war against a hostile state apparatus, not a license to attack individual believers or peaceful communities.
| # | 📜 Condition in the Verse | 🧠 Classical Interpretation & Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | لَا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ "Do not believe in God" | Al-Baghawī resolves the apparent contradiction: "If it is said: 'The People of the Book do believe in God and the Last Day?' It is said: They do not believe like the belief of the believers, for when they say 'Uzayr is the son of God' and 'the Messiah is the son of God,' that is not belief in God." This refers to a theological war—a specific type of disbelief that violates core Islamic monotheism. |
| 2 | وَلَا بِالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ "Nor in the Last Day" | Al-Ṭabarī explains this means "they do not affirm Paradise or Hell," indicating a rejection of the Islamic eschatological framework and its moral consequences. |
| 3 | وَلَا يُحَرِّمُونَ مَا حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ "Nor do they forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden" | This establishes a moral and legal war. They actively permit what Islam holds to be morally repugnant, setting their own law against the Sharia. |
| 4 | وَلَا يَدِينُونَ دِينَ الْحَقِّ "Nor do they follow the religion of truth" | Al-Baghawī (via Qatādah): "Truth is God, meaning: they do not follow the religion of God, and His religion is Islam." Al-Ṭabarī: "They do not obey God with the obedience of the people of Islam." This is the culmination: a rejection of Islamic sovereignty and a refusal to submit to its political and religious authority. |
⚔️ The Combined Effect: A person or polity is only a target if they meet all four conditions. This describes a group in a state of total ideological and political belligerence—one that rejects Islamic theology, morality, and sovereignty. It is a declaration of war against a hostile state apparatus, not a license to attack individual believers or peaceful communities.
🏛️ The Historical Occasion (Sabab al-Nuzūl): Who Was It Revealed Against?
The classical commentators are unanimous that this was not an abstract command but was revealed to address immediate, specific military threats.
Commentator Historical Context Cited 🎯 Implication Mujāhid (in Al-Baghawī) "This verse was revealed when the Messenger of God was commanded to fight the Romans." The initial target was the Roman Empire, a superpower that controlled Syria and was perceived as a direct threat to the Muslim community. Al-Kalbī (in Al-Baghawī) "It was revealed concerning Qurayẓa and al-Naḍīr of the Jews... This was the first jizya the people of Islam received." It was also applied to specific Jewish tribes in Arabia who had broken their treaties with the Prophet and conspired against the Muslim community in Medina.
| Commentator | Historical Context Cited | 🎯 Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Mujāhid (in Al-Baghawī) | "This verse was revealed when the Messenger of God was commanded to fight the Romans." | The initial target was the Roman Empire, a superpower that controlled Syria and was perceived as a direct threat to the Muslim community. |
| Al-Kalbī (in Al-Baghawī) | "It was revealed concerning Qurayẓa and al-Naḍīr of the Jews... This was the first jizya the people of Islam received." | It was also applied to specific Jewish tribes in Arabia who had broken their treaties with the Prophet and conspired against the Muslim community in Medina. |
✅ Historical Application: The Principle in Practice
The early Muslim community understood this restricted scope perfectly. They fought those who met the conditions of belligerence and made peace with those who did not.
Case Study Relation to the "Four Conditions" Outcome The Romans at Tabuk Met all conditions: Theological deviation, moral rejection, and active political/military hostility. Fought. The Prophet led an expedition against them. The Jews of Khaybar After conquest, they surrendered and accepted political submission. Treaty. They were allowed to remain on their land, working it in exchange for a share of the produce. The Christians of Najran A peaceful delegation. They did not engage in hostilities. Treaty. The Prophet wrote a famous covenant guaranteeing their protection, freedom of religion, and property in return for an annual tribute. The People of Ayla & Adhruḥ Communities on the Roman frontier who chose not to fight. Treaty. They paid the jizya and were granted full protection, establishing the model for the future dhimma system.
Conclusion: The command in 9:29 was a specific declaration of war against specific, hostile powers (the Roman Empire and treacherous Arabian tribes), not a universal command for perpetual conflict. The "belligerent subset" was defined by their actions and political stance. The moment these groups ceased their belligerence and accepted political submission through the payment of jizya, the legal cause for fighting them ceased, as proven by the countless treaties that followed.
| Case Study | Relation to the "Four Conditions" | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| The Romans at Tabuk | Met all conditions: Theological deviation, moral rejection, and active political/military hostility. | Fought. The Prophet led an expedition against them. |
| The Jews of Khaybar | After conquest, they surrendered and accepted political submission. | Treaty. They were allowed to remain on their land, working it in exchange for a share of the produce. |
| The Christians of Najran | A peaceful delegation. They did not engage in hostilities. | Treaty. The Prophet wrote a famous covenant guaranteeing their protection, freedom of religion, and property in return for an annual tribute. |
| The People of Ayla & Adhruḥ | Communities on the Roman frontier who chose not to fight. | Treaty. They paid the jizya and were granted full protection, establishing the model for the future dhimma system. |
💰 2. The Stopping Condition: "Until they give the Jizya"
The ultimate goal of the command in Verse 29 is not annihilation, expulsion, or forced conversion, but a political settlement. The word "حَتَّىٰ" (ḥattā)—"until"—is a critical term of limitation. It establishes a clear end-point for the state of war, which is the acceptance of a specific contractual arrangement: the payment of the jizya.
🔤 The Linguistic Root: A Contractual Recompense
The classical lexicographers and commentators anchor the meaning of jizya in its Arabic root, which reveals its inherent nature as a reciprocal transaction.
Source 📖 Original Arabic Analysis 🧾 Translation & Implication Al-Ṭabarī و " الجزية ": الفِعْلة من: " جزى فلان فلانًا ما عليه "، إذا قضاه, " يجزيه "، و " الجِزْية " مثل " القِعْدة " و " الجِلْسة ". "And 'al-jizyah' is the verbal noun from 'Jazā fulānun fulānan' (so-and-so recompensed so-and-so what was upon him), meaning he fulfilled it for him... and 'al-jizyah' is like 'al-qī'dah' (the sitting) and 'al-jilsah' (the session)." Al-Baghawī ... ( حتى يعطوا الجزية ) وهي الخراج المضروب على رقابهم "... (Until they give the jizya) and it is the kharāj imposed upon their necks."
The Key Insight from the Root J-Z-Y (ج ز ي):-The root means to recompense, to reward, or to give something in return for something else. This frames the jizya not as a punitive fine or mere tribute, but as a quid pro quo. It is the material fulfillment of one side of a bargain.
| Source | 📖 Original Arabic Analysis | 🧾 Translation & Implication |
|---|---|---|
| Al-Ṭabarī | و " الجزية ": الفِعْلة من: " جزى فلان فلانًا ما عليه "، إذا قضاه, " يجزيه "، و " الجِزْية " مثل " القِعْدة " و " الجِلْسة ". | "And 'al-jizyah' is the verbal noun from 'Jazā fulānun fulānan' (so-and-so recompensed so-and-so what was upon him), meaning he fulfilled it for him... and 'al-jizyah' is like 'al-qī'dah' (the sitting) and 'al-jilsah' (the session)." |
| Al-Baghawī | ... ( حتى يعطوا الجزية ) وهي الخراج المضروب على رقابهم | "... (Until they give the jizya) and it is the kharāj imposed upon their necks." |
📜 The Classical Framing: A Payment for Protection
The early commentators explicitly defined this contractual nature.
Commentator 💬 Interpretation of Jizya 🛡️ The Implied Contract Al-Ṭabarī حتى يعطوا الخراجَ عن رقابهم، الذي يبذلونه للمسلمين دَفْعًا عنها.
"...until they give the kharāj for their necks, which they offer the Muslims as a protection for them (dafʿan ʿanhā)." This is the clearest definition. The jizya is a payment "for their necks"—for their very lives and persons. They offer it to the Muslims, and in return, the Muslims provide dafʿ—a warding off, a defense, a protection. The contract is: payment in exchange for security. Al-Baghawī ...الخراج المضروب على رقابهم
"...the kharāj imposed upon their necks." By using the term kharāj (land tax/tribute) and linking it to their "necks" (riqābihim), Al-Baghawī reinforces the concept of a personal tax that secures their status as protected individuals.
⚖️ The Legal Principle: The jizya is the financial cornerstone of the dhimma covenant. It is not a punishment for disbelief, but the consideration (in legal terms) paid by the dhimmi to the Islamic state in return for the state's fulfillment of its duty: to protect the dhimmi's life, property, and right to practice their religion.
| Commentator | 💬 Interpretation of Jizya | 🛡️ The Implied Contract |
|---|---|---|
| Al-Ṭabarī | حتى يعطوا الخراجَ عن رقابهم، الذي يبذلونه للمسلمين دَفْعًا عنها. "...until they give the kharāj for their necks, which they offer the Muslims as a protection for them (dafʿan ʿanhā)." | This is the clearest definition. The jizya is a payment "for their necks"—for their very lives and persons. They offer it to the Muslims, and in return, the Muslims provide dafʿ—a warding off, a defense, a protection. The contract is: payment in exchange for security. |
| Al-Baghawī | ...الخراج المضروب على رقابهم "...the kharāj imposed upon their necks." | By using the term kharāj (land tax/tribute) and linking it to their "necks" (riqābihim), Al-Baghawī reinforces the concept of a personal tax that secures their status as protected individuals. |
⚖️ The Legal Principle: The jizya is the financial cornerstone of the dhimma covenant. It is not a punishment for disbelief, but the consideration (in legal terms) paid by the dhimmi to the Islamic state in return for the state's fulfillment of its duty: to protect the dhimmi's life, property, and right to practice their religion.
✅ Historical Application: The "Until" in Action
The entire history of the early conquests is a testament to this "stopping condition." The moment a community agreed to pay, the fighting ceased and a treaty was drafted.
Historical Case The "Stopping Condition" Triggered Resulting Contract The People of Ayla (Tabuk) They came to the Prophet and offered the jizya. A treaty was written: "For them is the protection of God and His Messenger... in return for 300 dinars annually." Fighting stopped. Damascus After a siege, the bishop sought terms. Khalid ibn al-Walid wrote a treaty: "He gave them a guarantee for themselves, their property, and their churches... They will be treated well as long as they pay the jizya." Fighting stopped. Al-Hīra (Iraq) The city elites negotiated a surrender. A peace agreement was made for 80,000 dirhams and their service as spies. The money was "the first to be brought from Iraq to Medina." Fighting stopped. Umar's Systemic Reform The conquest of entire provinces. Umar standardized the jizya across the empire (4 dinars/40 dirhams). This transformed it from individual tribute into a predictable annual tax, solidifying the end of hostilities and the beginning of integrated administration.
Conclusion: The phrase "ḥattā yuʿʿṭū l-jizyah" ("until they give the jizya") was the operational heart of the verse for the early Muslim state. It was a de-escalation clause. It provided a clear, lawful, and peaceful exit from the state of war, transforming a military confrontation into a stable, fiscal-political relationship. The "Coin of Conscience" was, in practice, a coin of peace.
| Historical Case | The "Stopping Condition" Triggered | Resulting Contract |
|---|---|---|
| The People of Ayla (Tabuk) | They came to the Prophet and offered the jizya. | A treaty was written: "For them is the protection of God and His Messenger... in return for 300 dinars annually." Fighting stopped. |
| Damascus | After a siege, the bishop sought terms. | Khalid ibn al-Walid wrote a treaty: "He gave them a guarantee for themselves, their property, and their churches... They will be treated well as long as they pay the jizya." Fighting stopped. |
| Al-Hīra (Iraq) | The city elites negotiated a surrender. | A peace agreement was made for 80,000 dirhams and their service as spies. The money was "the first to be brought from Iraq to Medina." Fighting stopped. |
| Umar's Systemic Reform | The conquest of entire provinces. | Umar standardized the jizya across the empire (4 dinars/40 dirhams). This transformed it from individual tribute into a predictable annual tax, solidifying the end of hostilities and the beginning of integrated administration. |
🤲 3. The Manner: "From [their] hand" (عَن يَدٍ)
The phrase "عَن يَدٍ" (ʿan yadin) generated significant debate among classical scholars, producing a spectrum of opinions ranging from the ceremonial to the contractual. However, when measured against the historical record of the early Caliphate, only one interpretation consistently aligns with the evidence: it signified a direct, formal, and contractual transaction, not a ritual of personal degradation.
📚 The Spectrum of Classical Opinions
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The commentators offered several nuanced views on what "from [their] hand" entailed.
Opinion Proponent 💬 Classical Interpretation (from Ṭabarī & Baghawī) 1. Direct, Personal Payment Ibn `Abbās "يعطونها بأيديهم ولا يرسلون بها على يد غيرهم"
"They give it with their own hands and do not send it with someone else." 2. Payment from a Position of Subjugation Abū 'Ubaydah "يقال لكل من أعطى شيئا كرها من غير طيب نفس : أعطاه عن يد"
"It is said for anyone who gives something unwillingly, without a content heart: 'He gave it ʿan yadin.'" 3. Payment in Cash, Not Credit Some Scholars (Baghawī) "عن يد أي : عن نقد لا نسيئة"
"From hand, meaning: in cash, not on credit." 4. Acknowledgment of a Favor Some Scholars (Baghawī) "عن إقرار بإنعام المسلمين عليهم بقبول الجزية منهم"
"From acknowledgment of the Muslims' favor upon them by accepting the jizya from them." 5. A Direct Hand-to-Hand Transaction Al-Ṭabarī "من يده إلى يد من يدفعه إليه"
"From his hand to the hand of the one he gives it to." He compares it to Arabic idioms like "I met him face-to-face (faman li-famin)" or "palm-to-palm (kaffatan li-kaffatin)."
| Opinion | Proponent | 💬 Classical Interpretation (from Ṭabarī & Baghawī) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Direct, Personal Payment | Ibn `Abbās | "يعطونها بأيديهم ولا يرسلون بها على يد غيرهم" "They give it with their own hands and do not send it with someone else." |
| 2. Payment from a Position of Subjugation | Abū 'Ubaydah | "يقال لكل من أعطى شيئا كرها من غير طيب نفس : أعطاه عن يد" "It is said for anyone who gives something unwillingly, without a content heart: 'He gave it ʿan yadin.'" |
| 3. Payment in Cash, Not Credit | Some Scholars (Baghawī) | "عن يد أي : عن نقد لا نسيئة" "From hand, meaning: in cash, not on credit." |
| 4. Acknowledgment of a Favor | Some Scholars (Baghawī) | "عن إقرار بإنعام المسلمين عليهم بقبول الجزية منهم" "From acknowledgment of the Muslims' favor upon them by accepting the jizya from them." |
| 5. A Direct Hand-to-Hand Transaction | Al-Ṭabarī | "من يده إلى يد من يدفعه إليه" "From his hand to the hand of the one he gives it to." He compares it to Arabic idioms like "I met him face-to-face (faman li-famin)" or "palm-to-palm (kaffatan li-kaffatin)." |
⚖️ Analysis: Which Interpretation Fits the Historical Evidence?
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When we test these opinions against the administrative practices of the Rashidun Caliphate, a clear winner emerges.
Opinion ❌ Evidence Against in Early Caliphate ✅ Evidence For in Early Caliphate 1. Direct, Personal Payment
(Ibn `Abbās) Partially Contradicted. The Caliphate often worked through existing power structures. Local elites, chieftains, and bishops (like in Damascus and al-Hīra) were responsible for collecting and handing over the tribute. The average farmer did not personally place a coin in the Caliph's hand. In Spirit, Yes. The payment was formal and direct from the community to the state, represented by its officials. It was not an informal or hidden tax. 2. Payment from Subjugation
(Abū 'Ubaydah) Misleading if taken as a personal feeling. The treaties were legal instruments. The "subjugation" was the political fact of their new status (dhimmi), not a requirement for each taxpayer to feel a specific emotion during payment. Politically True. The jizya was the fiscal symbol of their political submission to Islamic sovereignty. The "unwillingness" was their acceptance of a subordinate political status, not individual bitterness. 3. Payment in Cash, Not Credit Partially Contradicted. While cash was preferred, the early system was highly flexible. The treaty with Maqnā was entirely in-kind (¼ of fish, thread, etc.). Umar's system explicitly included wheat, oil, and cloaks as part of the tax. Generally True. The core jizya was a cash payment (Dinars/Dirhams). The "cash" interpretation reflects the principle that the obligation was a fixed, certain duty, not a vague promise. 4. Acknowledgment of a Favor Ideologically Consistent, but Practically Invisible. The treaties do not frame the jizya as a "favor" the Muslims were granting, but as one half of a reciprocal contract. Reflects the State's View. From the Islamic perspective, granting protection was a favor, and the jizya was its due. This opinion sanctifies the fiscal relationship from the Muslim viewpoint. 5. A Direct Transaction
(Al-Ṭabarī) ✅ BEST FIT. This interpretation is neutral, legal, and administrative. It focuses on the nature of the transaction itself: formal, direct, and documented. ✅ PERFECTLY MATCHED. This is exactly how the early Caliphate operated. The treaties were written contracts (e.g., the Damascus document). The payments were recorded in diwans. The relationship was not one of random extortion but of scheduled, formal revenue collection.
| Opinion | ❌ Evidence Against in Early Caliphate | ✅ Evidence For in Early Caliphate |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Direct, Personal Payment (Ibn `Abbās) | Partially Contradicted. The Caliphate often worked through existing power structures. Local elites, chieftains, and bishops (like in Damascus and al-Hīra) were responsible for collecting and handing over the tribute. The average farmer did not personally place a coin in the Caliph's hand. | In Spirit, Yes. The payment was formal and direct from the community to the state, represented by its officials. It was not an informal or hidden tax. |
| 2. Payment from Subjugation (Abū 'Ubaydah) | Misleading if taken as a personal feeling. The treaties were legal instruments. The "subjugation" was the political fact of their new status (dhimmi), not a requirement for each taxpayer to feel a specific emotion during payment. | Politically True. The jizya was the fiscal symbol of their political submission to Islamic sovereignty. The "unwillingness" was their acceptance of a subordinate political status, not individual bitterness. |
| 3. Payment in Cash, Not Credit | Partially Contradicted. While cash was preferred, the early system was highly flexible. The treaty with Maqnā was entirely in-kind (¼ of fish, thread, etc.). Umar's system explicitly included wheat, oil, and cloaks as part of the tax. | Generally True. The core jizya was a cash payment (Dinars/Dirhams). The "cash" interpretation reflects the principle that the obligation was a fixed, certain duty, not a vague promise. |
| 4. Acknowledgment of a Favor | Ideologically Consistent, but Practically Invisible. The treaties do not frame the jizya as a "favor" the Muslims were granting, but as one half of a reciprocal contract. | Reflects the State's View. From the Islamic perspective, granting protection was a favor, and the jizya was its due. This opinion sanctifies the fiscal relationship from the Muslim viewpoint. |
| 5. A Direct Transaction (Al-Ṭabarī) | ✅ BEST FIT. This interpretation is neutral, legal, and administrative. It focuses on the nature of the transaction itself: formal, direct, and documented. | ✅ PERFECTLY MATCHED. This is exactly how the early Caliphate operated. The treaties were written contracts (e.g., the Damascus document). The payments were recorded in diwans. The relationship was not one of random extortion but of scheduled, formal revenue collection. |
✅ The Verdict of History: Substance Over Ceremony
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The historical practice of the early Caliphate reveals a focus on the substance of the fiscal relationship, not its ceremony.
Pragmatic Collection: The Muslims consistently leveraged local power structures to collect taxes. In al-Hīra, they dealt with the existing Arab client-kings, In Syria, they treated with bishops and city councils. They did not insist on a ritual where every individual personally handed a coin to a Muslim general.
The "Hand" was the Community to the State: The phrase "عَن يَدٍ" was fulfilled by the formal act of the community's representatives delivering the agreed-upon tribute to the state's representatives, as codified in a written pact (dhimma).
Umar's System is the Ultimate Proof: Umar ibn al-Khattab’s great reform was to systematize the jizya, turning varied treaties into a standardized, predictable tax. This was the apex of treating jizya as a matter of public finance and administration, not personal ritual.
Conclusion: The most historically accurate understanding of "عَن يَدٍ" is Al-Ṭabarī's: it signifies a direct, formal, and contractual transaction. The "hand" symbolizes the directness of the obligation and the certainty of the contract. The early Islamic state was built on ledgers and treaties, not on rituals of humiliation. The "Coin of Conscience" was passed from hand to hand as a formal token of a political covenant, its value derived from the protection it purchased, not from any shame in its giving.
Pragmatic Collection: The Muslims consistently leveraged local power structures to collect taxes. In al-Hīra, they dealt with the existing Arab client-kings, In Syria, they treated with bishops and city councils. They did not insist on a ritual where every individual personally handed a coin to a Muslim general.
The "Hand" was the Community to the State: The phrase "عَن يَدٍ" was fulfilled by the formal act of the community's representatives delivering the agreed-upon tribute to the state's representatives, as codified in a written pact (dhimma).
Umar's System is the Ultimate Proof: Umar ibn al-Khattab’s great reform was to systematize the jizya, turning varied treaties into a standardized, predictable tax. This was the apex of treating jizya as a matter of public finance and administration, not personal ritual.
🧎 4. The State: "While they are Ṣāghirūn" (وَهُمْ صَاغِرُونَ)
This is the most contested phrase in the verse, a single word upon which modern polemics and historical practices pivot. The classical sources present a stark dichotomy: on one side, vivid descriptions of ritual humiliation; on the other, a calm definition of political status. The key to resolving this lies not in collecting all opinions as equal, but in identifying which interpretation was operationalized into state policy by the founders of the Islamic fiscal system.
⚔️ The Two Warring Interpretations in Classical Sources
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The commentators of the Abbasid era, particularly Al-Ṭabarī and Al-Baghawī, recorded a spectrum of views that reflect the evolving social context of their time.
Type Proponent 💬 Interpretation & Prescribed Ritual 🛑 Ritual Humiliation `Ikrimah (in Ṭabarī & Baghawī) "أن يعطيها وهو قائمٌ، والآخذ جالسٌ"
"That he gives it while he is standing, and the receiver is seated." 🛑 Ritual Humiliation Al-Kalbī (in Baghawī) "إذا أعطى صفع في قفاه"
"When he gives it, he is slapped on the back of his neck." 🛑 Ritual Humiliation Ibn `Abbās (in one disputed report in Baghawī) "تؤخذ منه ويوطأ عنقه"
"It is taken from him and his neck is trodden upon." 🛑 Ritual Humiliation Other Abbasid-Era Scholars (in Baghawī) "يؤخذ بلحيته ويضرب في لهزمتيه . وقيل : يلبب ويجر إلى موضع الإعطاء بعنف"
"He is taken by his beard and struck on his jaws. It is said: he is grabbed by the neck and dragged violently to the place of payment." ✅ Political Submission Al-Ṭabarī (Primary Definition) "وهم أذلاء مقهورون"
"They are humbled, subdued." This is a general description of their legal status. ✅ Political Submission Other Scholars (in Ṭabarī) "إعطاؤهم إياها، هو الصغار"
"Their giving it is the humiliation (ṣaghār)." The act of payment itself signifies the acceptance of a subordinate political status. ✅ Political Submission Al-Shāfiʿī (in Baghawī) "الصغار هو جريان أحكام الإسلام عليهم"
"The ṣaghār is the application of the rulings of Islam upon them." This is the ultimate legalistic definition: ṣaghār is their subjection to Islamic law and sovereignty.
| Type | Proponent | 💬 Interpretation & Prescribed Ritual |
|---|---|---|
| 🛑 Ritual Humiliation | `Ikrimah (in Ṭabarī & Baghawī) | "أن يعطيها وهو قائمٌ، والآخذ جالسٌ" "That he gives it while he is standing, and the receiver is seated." |
| 🛑 Ritual Humiliation | Al-Kalbī (in Baghawī) | "إذا أعطى صفع في قفاه" "When he gives it, he is slapped on the back of his neck." |
| 🛑 Ritual Humiliation | Ibn `Abbās (in one disputed report in Baghawī) | "تؤخذ منه ويوطأ عنقه" "It is taken from him and his neck is trodden upon." |
| 🛑 Ritual Humiliation | Other Abbasid-Era Scholars (in Baghawī) | "يؤخذ بلحيته ويضرب في لهزمتيه . وقيل : يلبب ويجر إلى موضع الإعطاء بعنف" "He is taken by his beard and struck on his jaws. It is said: he is grabbed by the neck and dragged violently to the place of payment." |
| ✅ Political Submission | Al-Ṭabarī (Primary Definition) | "وهم أذلاء مقهورون" "They are humbled, subdued." This is a general description of their legal status. |
| ✅ Political Submission | Other Scholars (in Ṭabarī) | "إعطاؤهم إياها، هو الصغار" "Their giving it is the humiliation (ṣaghār)." The act of payment itself signifies the acceptance of a subordinate political status. |
| ✅ Political Submission | Al-Shāfiʿī (in Baghawī) | "الصغار هو جريان أحكام الإسلام عليهم" "The ṣaghār is the application of the rulings of Islam upon them." This is the ultimate legalistic definition: ṣaghār is their subjection to Islamic law and sovereignty. |
🕰️ Context Matters: The Abbasid Lens
It is crucial to recognize that Al-Ṭabarī (d. 923 CE) and Al-Baghawī (d. 1122 CE) lived in the Abbasid era, a period where the social status of dhimmis had declined significantly from the early Caliphate. The elaborate rituals of humiliation they recorded reflect:
Later Social Realities: The Abbasid period saw the codification of the Pact of Umar, which contained restrictive social regulations for dhimmis.
Sectarian Polemics: These narratives often served a polemical purpose, emphasizing the superiority of Islam in an era of complex interfaith relations.
Theoretical Speculation: Many of these reports are isolated and represent the opinions of specific ascetic preachers (like `Ikrimah) rather than recorded state practice.
Later Social Realities: The Abbasid period saw the codification of the Pact of Umar, which contained restrictive social regulations for dhimmis.
Sectarian Polemics: These narratives often served a polemical purpose, emphasizing the superiority of Islam in an era of complex interfaith relations.
Theoretical Speculation: Many of these reports are isolated and represent the opinions of specific ascetic preachers (like `Ikrimah) rather than recorded state practice.
✅ The Verdict of History: What the Early Caliphate Actually Did
When we test these interpretations against the historical record of the Rashidun Caliphate, the evidence is overwhelming and consistent.
Interpretation ❌ Evidence Against in Early Caliphate Treaties & Policies ✅ Evidence For in Early Caliphate Treaties & Policies Ritual Humiliation
(Slapping, dragging, treading on necks) Absolutely None. Not a single treaty from the Prophet, Abu Bakr, or Umar mentions these acts. The documents focus on payment amounts, guarantees of protection, and property rights. The entire administrative system was designed for efficiency and stability, not for staging public spectacles of degradation. None. The historical record is completely silent on enforced rituals of personal humiliation during tax collection. Political Submission
(Ṭabarī's "humbled, subdued," Shāfiʿī's "application of Islamic law") Fits Perfectly. The entire dhimma system is one of political submission to Islamic sovereignty. The phrase "while they are ṣāghirūn" describes their legal status as non-citizen subjects who have submitted to the state's authority and law. All of it. The treaties of Tabuk, Ayla, Damascus, and al-Hīra all establish this relationship. The jizya was the fiscal marker of this political reality. Umar's centralized system, with its standardized rates and dīwān, institutionalized this status on a massive, bureaucratic scale. The "humiliation" was the objective, legal fact of their subordination.
The Ultimate Proof: Al-Shāfiʿī's Definition
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The opinion of Imam Al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820 CE), who founded one of the four major schools of Islamic law, is the most decisive. He defines ṣāghirūn not as a feeling or a ritual, but as a legal condition: "The ṣaghār is the application of the rulings of Islam upon them."
This means:
They are subject to Islamic law in public life.
Their political loyalty is to the Islamic state.
They are exempt from military service but pay a tax in lieu.
Their personal safety and religious rights are guaranteed by the state.
This is a precise description of the dhimmi status as it was implemented from the very beginning.
| Interpretation | ❌ Evidence Against in Early Caliphate Treaties & Policies | ✅ Evidence For in Early Caliphate Treaties & Policies |
|---|---|---|
| Ritual Humiliation (Slapping, dragging, treading on necks) | Absolutely None. Not a single treaty from the Prophet, Abu Bakr, or Umar mentions these acts. The documents focus on payment amounts, guarantees of protection, and property rights. The entire administrative system was designed for efficiency and stability, not for staging public spectacles of degradation. | None. The historical record is completely silent on enforced rituals of personal humiliation during tax collection. |
| Political Submission (Ṭabarī's "humbled, subdued," Shāfiʿī's "application of Islamic law") | Fits Perfectly. The entire dhimma system is one of political submission to Islamic sovereignty. The phrase "while they are ṣāghirūn" describes their legal status as non-citizen subjects who have submitted to the state's authority and law. | All of it. The treaties of Tabuk, Ayla, Damascus, and al-Hīra all establish this relationship. The jizya was the fiscal marker of this political reality. Umar's centralized system, with its standardized rates and dīwān, institutionalized this status on a massive, bureaucratic scale. The "humiliation" was the objective, legal fact of their subordination. |
They are subject to Islamic law in public life.
Their political loyalty is to the Islamic state.
They are exempt from military service but pay a tax in lieu.
Their personal safety and religious rights are guaranteed by the state.
🧭 Conclusion: The Founders' Intent vs. Later Interpretations
The early Islamic state, in its practical administration, interpreted ṣāghirūn as a state of political submission, not a mandate for ritual humiliation. The "humiliation" was the objective, legal fact of their subordination to Islamic sovereignty, symbolized by the payment of the tax itself.
The more extreme, ritualistic opinions, while recorded in later texts, remained marginal to statecraft. They found no footing in the treaties of the Prophet, the fiscal reforms of Umar, or the foundational legal theory of Al-Shāfiʿī. They are artifacts of a later social climate, retrojected onto a verse whose original application was far more pragmatic and administrative. The "Coin of Conscience" was a token of a political contract, not a prop in a theater of abuse.
⚖️ III. The Theological Justification: The Core Deviation (Qur'an 9:30)
Immediately after the command to fight until the payment of jizya, the Qur'an provides the fundamental theological reason for the confrontation. This is not an unrelated polemic; it is the ideological casus belli. The verse identifies the specific doctrinal corruption—shirk (associating partners with God)—that defines the "belligerent subset" of People of the Book mentioned in verse 29.
📖 The Verse in Full
الآيَة: وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ عُزَيْرٌ ابْنُ اللَّهِ وَقَالَتِ النَّصَارَى الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ اللَّهِ ۖ ذَٰلِكَ قَوْلُهُم بِأَفْوَاهِهِمْ ۖ يُضَاهِئُونَ قَوْلَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِن قَبْلُ ۚ قَاتَلَهُمُ اللَّهُ ۚ أَنَّىٰ يُؤْفَكُونَ
Translation: "And the Jews say, 'Uzayr is the son of God,' and the Christians say, 'The Messiah is the son of God.' That is the saying from their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before [them]. May God destroy them; how are they deluded?"
🔍 Deconstructing the Accusation: "Son of God"
The verse makes a stunning theological accusation against both major scriptural communities. The classical commentators grappled with its scope and origin.
Community Accusation in the Verse 🧠 Classical Opinions on Who Said This & Why 👳 The Jews
"عُزَيْرٌ ابْنُ اللَّهِ" That they claim Ezra is the son of God. 1. A Specific Individual:
• Proponent: Ibn Jubayr (in Ṭabarī).
• Opinion: It was a single man named Finḥāṣ (Phineas) who said this.
• Context: This Finḥāṣ is the same one who said, "God is poor and we are rich" (Qur'an 3:181).
2. A Group of Medinan Opponents:
• Proponent: Ibn `Abbās (in Ṭabarī).
• Opinion: A delegation of Jews (Salām bin Mashkam, etc.) came to the Prophet and challenged him, saying, "How can we follow you when you have left our Qibla and you do not claim that Ezra is the son of God?"
3. A Doctrinal Belief Based on Legend:
• Proponent: Al-Ṭabarī & Al-Suddī.
• Opinion: They recount a long narrative: The Torah was lost, Ezra miraculously reproduced it from memory, and the people exclaimed, "He could only have done this if he were the son of God!" This was an exclamation of awe, not a formal doctrine. ✝️ The Christians
"الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ اللَّهِ" That they claim Jesus is the son of God. This was understood as a direct reference to mainstream Christian Trinitarian doctrine, which the Qur'an considers a form of shirk (assigning partners to God).
| Community | Accusation in the Verse | 🧠 Classical Opinions on Who Said This & Why |
|---|---|---|
| 👳 The Jews "عُزَيْرٌ ابْنُ اللَّهِ" | That they claim Ezra is the son of God. | 1. A Specific Individual: • Proponent: Ibn Jubayr (in Ṭabarī). • Opinion: It was a single man named Finḥāṣ (Phineas) who said this. • Context: This Finḥāṣ is the same one who said, "God is poor and we are rich" (Qur'an 3:181). 2. A Group of Medinan Opponents: • Proponent: Ibn `Abbās (in Ṭabarī). • Opinion: A delegation of Jews (Salām bin Mashkam, etc.) came to the Prophet and challenged him, saying, "How can we follow you when you have left our Qibla and you do not claim that Ezra is the son of God?" 3. A Doctrinal Belief Based on Legend: • Proponent: Al-Ṭabarī & Al-Suddī. • Opinion: They recount a long narrative: The Torah was lost, Ezra miraculously reproduced it from memory, and the people exclaimed, "He could only have done this if he were the son of God!" This was an exclamation of awe, not a formal doctrine. |
| ✝️ The Christians "الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ اللَّهِ" | That they claim Jesus is the son of God. | This was understood as a direct reference to mainstream Christian Trinitarian doctrine, which the Qur'an considers a form of shirk (assigning partners to God). |
🧩 The Historical Context: Gordon Newby's Analysis
The modern scholar Gordon D. Newby, in A History of the Jews of Arabia, provides a plausible historical-critical explanation that reconciles the classical accounts. He suggests the verse reflects an encounter with Jewish mystical groups in the Hijaz who held esoteric beliefs about Ezra.
Ezra as a Divine Scribe: In some Jewish mystical traditions (reflected in texts like 3 Enoch), figures like Enoch and Ezra were "translated to heaven" and transformed into a powerful, angelic being (like Metatron), who was given divine knowledge and authority.
"Son of God" Terminology: In this context, "Son of God" (Bene Elohim) could be an honorific title for a supremely righteous man or an angelic being, not a literal claim of physical progeny.
The Connection to the Aḥbār: Verse 9:31 condemns taking "their rabbis (aḥbār) and their monks as lords." Newby argues the Jews the Prophet encountered were influenced by these mystical traditions, exalting their learned rabbis (aḥbār) and, by extension, a figure like Ezra, to a semi-divine status.
💡 Synthesis: The classical and modern sources converge. The "Jews" referenced were a specific, influential group in Medina whose theological exuberance—perhaps exclaiming "Ezra is like a son of God!" after a miracle or holding esoteric beliefs about his angelic status—was understood and condemned by the Qur'an as a fundamental violation of pure monotheism, parallel to Christian Christology.
Ezra as a Divine Scribe: In some Jewish mystical traditions (reflected in texts like 3 Enoch), figures like Enoch and Ezra were "translated to heaven" and transformed into a powerful, angelic being (like Metatron), who was given divine knowledge and authority.
"Son of God" Terminology: In this context, "Son of God" (Bene Elohim) could be an honorific title for a supremely righteous man or an angelic being, not a literal claim of physical progeny.
The Connection to the Aḥbār: Verse 9:31 condemns taking "their rabbis (aḥbār) and their monks as lords." Newby argues the Jews the Prophet encountered were influenced by these mystical traditions, exalting their learned rabbis (aḥbār) and, by extension, a figure like Ezra, to a semi-divine status.
💡 Synthesis: The classical and modern sources converge. The "Jews" referenced were a specific, influential group in Medina whose theological exuberance—perhaps exclaiming "Ezra is like a son of God!" after a miracle or holding esoteric beliefs about his angelic status—was understood and condemned by the Qur'an as a fundamental violation of pure monotheism, parallel to Christian Christology.
📣 The Rhetorical Force: Mimicry and Divine Condemnation
The verse uses powerful rhetorical devices to frame this theological error as not just a mistake, but a deliberate perversion that severs the accused from the legacy of Abrahamic monotheism.
🗣️ "That is the saying from their mouths" (ذَٰلِكَ قَوْلُهُم بِأَفْوَاهِهِمْ)
This phrase deliberately diminishes the theological claims, presenting them as empty sounds rather than profound truths.
| Source | 💬 Interpretation | 🎯 Rhetorical Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Al-Baghawī | "يقولون بألسنتهم من غير علم" "They say with their tongues without knowledge." "لم يذكر الله تعالى قولا مقرونا بالأفواه والألسن إلا كان ذلك زورا" "God did not mention a statement coupled with 'mouths' and 'tongues' except that it was falsehood." | This is a profound linguistic observation. By attributing the claim to their physical "mouths," the Qur'an de-sacralizes it. It frames a core Christological and (in this context) Jewish belief as mere human noise, devoid of divine inspiration or intellectual substance. It robs the claim of any spiritual weight. |
🔄 "They imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before..." (يُضَاهِئُونَ قَوْلَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِن قَبْلُ)
The verb yuḍāhiʔūn/yuḍāhūn (يضاهئون/يضاهون) was intensely debated, but its ultimate meaning delivers a profound theological condemnation. The primary and most powerful opinion is that it accuses both the Jews and Christians of mimicking the polytheists of old.
| Debate Aspect | 👥 Opinions from Ṭabarī & Baghawī | 🔍 Meaning & Implications |
|---|---|---|
| Linguistic Form | • Most Readers (Hijaz/Iraq): يُضَاهُونَ (without hamzah) • ʿĀṣim: يُضَاهِئُونَ (with hamzah) • Al-Ṭabarī's Verdict: "The correct reading is without the hamzah," as it is the most widespread and eloquent. • Meaning: From the root *ḍ-h-w*, meaning to rival, imitate, match, or make alike. | The core idea is mimicry and parallel creation. They are creating a theological counterpart to the polytheism of old. |
| ✅ Primary Opinion: Imitating Pagans | • Ibn `Abbās: "قالوا مثل ما قال أهل الأوثان" ("They said like what the people of the idols said.") • Mujāhid: (Implied in Al-Baghawī's summary). • Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī: "شبه كفرهم بكفر الذين مضوا من الأمم الكافرة" ("He made their disbelief resemble the disbelief of the past nations who disbelieved.") | This is the ultimate condemnation. It places the theological error of the Scriptural communities—those entrusted with divine revelation—on the same level as the "ignorant" paganism of pre-Islamic Arabia who worshipped al-Lāt, al-`Uzzā, and Manāt. It represents a catastrophic failure of their custodianship of revelation. They have become what they were meant to replace. |
| Secondary Opinion: Christians Imitating Jews | • Qatādah: "ضاهت النصارى قول اليهود قبلهم" ("The Christians imitated the saying of the Jews before them.") • Al-Suddī: "النصارى يضاهئون قول اليهود" ("The Christians imitate the saying of the Jews.") | This creates a chain of error, but it is a weaker interpretation. It makes the Christians the primary target of the verb, whereas the primary opinion targets both groups equally for the same fundamental sin: shirk. |
➡️ The Logical Flow of Condemnation
The "imitating pagans" interpretation completes a devastating theological argument:
👥 The Accusation: The Jews say "Ezra is the son of God." The Christians say "The Messiah is the son of God."
🔗 The Connection: يُضَاهِئُونَ قَوْلَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِن قَبْلُ - "They imitate the saying of those who disbelieved before..."
Who are "those who disbelieved before"? The pagan Arabs and all ancient polytheists who ascribed children to God.
What is the "saying" they imitate? The core statement of shirk: that God has partners, offspring, or equals.
⚖️ The Implication: By making this theological claim, the "People of the Book" have abdicated their unique status. They are no longer meaningfully distinct from the polytheists (mushrikūn) mentioned in Verse 28. Their "scripture" is now overshadowed by their "saying."
This is why the command to fight them in Verse 29 is justified. It is not a war against "belief," but a confrontation with a political-theological entity that has, in the eyes of the Qur'an, become functionally equivalent to the polytheist powers it was sent to displace. The jizya then becomes the mechanism to re-establish a relationship with these communities on new terms—terms defined by Islamic sovereignty, which insists on absolute monotheism as the basis for public order.
⚡ "May God destroy them!" (قَاتَلَهُمُ اللَّهُ)
This is a divine imprecation, not a military command. The classical scholars debated its precise grammatical nature and force.
| Opinion | Proponent (in Ṭabarī) | 💬 Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| A Curse (Lā`nah) | Ibn `Abbās (primary opinion) | "لعنهم الله" ("May God curse them."). Al-Ṭabarī states this is the meaning of every instance of qutila in the Qur'an. |
| An Expression of Amazement | Arab Linguists | It is akin to other Qur'anic exclamations like "قُتِلَ الْخَرَّاصُونَ" ("Perish the conjecturers!"). It is not a literal call for killing but a powerful expression of divine wrath and astonishment at their misguidance. |
| A Rare Grammatical Form | Ibn Jubayr | A unique Arabic construct expressing condemnation, similar to phrases like "عافاك الله" ("May God preserve you"). |
✅ Consensus: All opinions agree this is a theological condemnation from God, not a physical command to the believers. It expresses severe disapproval of this specific shirk, separating it from the legal ruling on jizya that precedes it.
❓ "How are they deluded?" (أَنَّىٰ يُؤْفَكُونَ)
This concluding phrase seals the argument with a powerful rhetorical question.
| Source | 💬 Interpretation | 🎯 Final Rhetorical Blow |
|---|---|---|
| Al-Ṭabarī | "أيَّ وجه يُذْهبُ بهم، ويحيدون؟ وكيف يصدُّون عن الحق؟" "By what way are they taken away, and do they deviate? And how are they turned away from the truth?" | This frames their belief not as a simple error, but as a form of spiritual insanity or profound misguidance. After the evidence of God's oneness, their persistent deviation is presented as baffling and illogical. |
Conclusion of the Rhetorical Sequence:
The passage moves from dismissal ("a saying from their mouths") to association ("they imitate the pagans") to divine condemnation ("May God curse them") to bewilderment ("How are they deluded?"). This systematic deconstruction serves to completely invalidate the theological position of the targeted groups, justifying the political and military stance outlined in verse 29. The "Coin of Conscience" was thus the resolution for a conflict that was, at its root, ideological and theological.
➡️ The Logical Flow to the Jizya Command
Verses 30 is not a disconnected aside, it is the essential link in the argument of the passage.
Verse 28: Establishes the principle of separating from polytheists (mushrikūn) and a promise of divine provision.
Verse 29: Commands fighting a subset of the People of the Book until they pay jizya.
Verses 30: Explains who that subset is. They are the ones who have crossed the line into a form of shirk by deifying their religious figures (Ezra, Jesus) and taking their rabbis and monks as lords beside God. Their "disbelief" is not passive; it is an active, ideological aggression against core Islamic monotheism.
This theological stance translates into political belligerence, justifying the command in verse 29.
Conclusion: The jizya, therefore, was not imposed on People of the Book for simply being Jewish or Christian. It was the political consequence for a specific group among them whose theological deviations had manifested as political hostility, forcing a military confrontation. The "Coin of Conscience" was the price for peace with a polity whose foundational ideology was seen as an existential threat to the new monotheistic order.
Verse 28: Establishes the principle of separating from polytheists (mushrikūn) and a promise of divine provision.
Verse 29: Commands fighting a subset of the People of the Book until they pay jizya.
Verses 30: Explains who that subset is. They are the ones who have crossed the line into a form of shirk by deifying their religious figures (Ezra, Jesus) and taking their rabbis and monks as lords beside God. Their "disbelief" is not passive; it is an active, ideological aggression against core Islamic monotheism.
This theological stance translates into political belligerence, justifying the command in verse 29.
🎯 IV. The Redefinition of Lordship: Obedience as Worship (Qur'an 9:31)
This verse delivers the final, devastating theological blow. It moves beyond the critique of Christological and Ezra-centric beliefs to attack the entire power structure that enables such doctrines. It redefines "taking as lords" not as bowing to idols, but as granting ultimate authority to religious leaders in matters of law and morality, thereby obeying them over God.
📖 The Verse in Full
الآيَة: اتَّخَذُوا أَحْبَارَهُمْ وَرُهْبَانَهُمْ أَرْبَابًا مِّن دُونِ اللَّهِ وَالْمَسِيحَ ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ وَمَا أُمِرُوا إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُوا إِلَٰهًا وَاحِدًا ۖ لَّا إِلَٰهَ إِلَّا هُوَ ۚ سُبْحَانَهُ عَمَّا يُشْرِكُونَ
Translation:
"They have taken their rabbis (aḥbār) and their monks (ruhbān) as lords besides God, and [also] the Messiah, the son of Mary. And they were not commanded except to worship one God; there is no deity except Him. Exalted is He above whatever they associate [with Him]."
🔍 Deconstructing the "Lords": Aḥbār, Ruhbān, and the Messiah
The verse accuses the communities of elevating three categories to the status of "lords" (arbāb) alongside God.
"Lord" Taken 👥 Group 🧕 Identity (from Ṭabarī & Baghawī) 💂 The Nature of their "Lordship" أَحْبَارَهُمْ
(Their Rabbis) Jews "العلماء" (The Scholars). The Aḥbār are the religious scholars and jurists. They are obeyed in their legal rulings (aḥkām), even when these contradict divine law. رُهْبَانَهُمْ
(Their Monks) Christians "أصحاب الصوامع وأهل الاجتهاد في دينهم" (The dwellers of monasteries and those who strive in their religion). They are followed in their ascetic practices and religious innovations. الْمَسِيحَ ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ
(The Messiah) Christians Jesus Christ. He is worshipped as a divine entity, the "Son of God."
| "Lord" Taken | 👥 Group | 🧕 Identity (from Ṭabarī & Baghawī) | 💂 The Nature of their "Lordship" |
|---|---|---|---|
| أَحْبَارَهُمْ (Their Rabbis) | Jews | "العلماء" (The Scholars). The Aḥbār are the religious scholars and jurists. | They are obeyed in their legal rulings (aḥkām), even when these contradict divine law. |
| رُهْبَانَهُمْ (Their Monks) | Christians | "أصحاب الصوامع وأهل الاجتهاد في دينهم" (The dwellers of monasteries and those who strive in their religion). | They are followed in their ascetic practices and religious innovations. |
| الْمَسِيحَ ابْنَ مَرْيَمَ (The Messiah) | Christians | Jesus Christ. | He is worshipped as a divine entity, the "Son of God." |
💡 The Revolutionary Interpretation: Obedience as Worship
The most powerful aspect of this verse, as explained by the classical commentators, is its radical redefinition of what it means to "take as a lord" (ittikhādh arbāb). It severs the concept of divinity from mere ritual and anchors it in the ultimate authority to legislate. This was not about bowing to idols, but about bowing to the decrees of religious authorities when they contravened divine law.
🗣️ The Definitive Clarification: The Prophet's Lesson to `Adī ibn Ḥātim
The most famous and decisive interpretation comes from a direct exchange between the Prophet and a convert, `Adī ibn Ḥātim, who was previously a Christian. This narrative, recorded by Al-Ṭabarī and Al-Baghawī, provides the authoritative understanding.
| Step | 🗨️ Dialogue (Arabic) | 🗨️ Dialogue (Translation) | 💡 The Core Principle |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. The Protest | `Adī said: "يا رسول الله، إنا لسنا نعبدهم!" | "O Messenger of God, we do not worship them!" | `Adī, thinking of "worship" as ritualistic prayer and prostraction, sincerely objects. He cannot conceive that his community's respect for its clergy constitutes shirk. |
| 2. The Prophetic Counter-Question | The Prophet replied: "أليس يحرِّمون ما أحلَّ الله فتحرِّمونه، ويحلُّون ما حرَّم الله فتحلُّونه؟" | "Is it not true that they make unlawful what Allah has made lawful, so you make it unlawful, and they make lawful what Allah has made unlawful, so you make it lawful?" | The Prophet reframes the issue. He ignores ritual and focuses entirely on legislation. The key verbs are "yuḥarrimūn" (they forbid) and "yuḥillūn" (they permit). |
| 3. The Admission | `Adī said: "بلى!" | "Yes!" | `Adī confirms the core problem: the transfer of legislative authority from God to human religious elites. |
| 4. The Revolutionary Conclusion | The Prophet declared: "فتلك عبادتهم!" | "Then that is their worship!" | This is the theological masterstroke. Worship is redefined as obedience in legislation. Granting a human the authority to permit and forbid in opposition to God is to grant them a divine attribute. |
🔁 Corroborating Narratives: The Consensus of the Companions
This interpretation was not an isolated opinion but the consensus of the earliest Muslim community, as shown through other companions.
| Source | 🗣️ Statement | 🔍 Analysis & Key Term |
|---|---|---|
| Al-Ṭabarī (via Ḥudhayfah) | "أما إنهم لم يكونوا يصومون لهم ولا يصلون لهم... فتلك كانت رُبوبيَّتهم." "No, they did not fast or pray for them... That was their lordship (rubūbiyyatihim)." | The term "رُبوبيَّتهم" (rubūbiyyatihim) is critical. It means granting them the attribute of Rabb—the Regulator, the Sovereign, the One who commands and forbids. This is a functional lordship. |
| Al-Baghawī | "فاتخذوهم كالأرباب" "So they took them as if they were lords." | The phrase "كَالأَرْبَاب" (ka al-arbāb)—"as if they were lords"—is crucial. It indicates that this is not a declarative belief in their divinity, but a functional one enacted through obedience. |
🎯 The Ultimate Implications
This interpretation completes a devastating polemical sequence that justifies the entire passage:
It Exposes the Mechanism of Shirk: The greatest shirk is not always building an altar; it is building a legislature that rivals God's authority.
It Redefines the Conflict: The confrontation in Verse 29 is not with "unbelief" in an abstract sense, but with a rival political sovereignty that has usurped God's legislative role.
It Justifies the Jizya: The jizya becomes the political instrument to dismantle this rival sovereignty. By submitting to the Islamic state, the dhimmi community agrees to live under God's law as interpreted by the Muslim polity, ending the "lordship" of their own clergy over public law and morality.
The "Coin of Conscience" was, therefore, the fee for exiting a system deemed theologically corrupt—a system where men played God by making their own laws—and entering a covenant where God's law was supreme.
🎭 The Rhetorical Masterstroke
This interpretation completes a devastating polemical sequence:
Verse 29: A political command to fight a belligerent group until they pay jizya.
Verse 30: The theological reason: they have committed shirk by claiming "sons for God."
Verse 31: The sociological mechanism of that shirk: They have transferred legislative sovereignty from God to their religious elites.
The verse argues that the core sin is not just a doctrinal error about God's nature, but a failure of political theology. By allowing their religious leaders to legislate contrary to God's will, they have created a system of multiple sovereignties—multiple "lordships."
The final phrase, "وَمَا أُمِرُوا إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُوا إِلَٰهًا وَاحِدًا" ("And they were not commanded except to worship one God"), is the coup de grâce. It reminds them that the entire purpose of their original revelation was to establish God's absolute, unitary sovereignty (ulūhiyyah), which they have now fractured by creating rival sources of law and authority.
This provides the ultimate justification for the Islamic state's demand for political submission. The jizya is the fiscal symbol of re-establishing God's sole sovereignty (ḥākimiyyah) in the public sphere, ending the "lordship" of rabbis, monks, and human legislators over the domain of divine law.
Verse 29: A political command to fight a belligerent group until they pay jizya.
Verse 30: The theological reason: they have committed shirk by claiming "sons for God."
Verse 31: The sociological mechanism of that shirk: They have transferred legislative sovereignty from God to their religious elites.
🌅 V. The Ultimate Triumph: The Nature of Divine Victory (Qur'an 9:32-33)
These concluding verses shift the perspective from the immediate political and military context to a cosmic, divine promise. They are not a command for believers to militarily subjugate the world, but a declaration of God's ultimate sovereignty and the inevitable triumph of the truth He has revealed. The Rashidun Caliphs understood this not as a mandate for forced conversion, but as a divine assurance that would be fulfilled through both political reality and spiritual truth.
These concluding verses shift the perspective from the immediate political and military context to a cosmic, divine promise. They are not a command for believers to militarily subjugate the world, but a declaration of God's ultimate sovereignty and the inevitable triumph of the truth He has revealed. The Rashidun Caliphs understood this not as a mandate for forced conversion, but as a divine assurance that would be fulfilled through both political reality and spiritual truth.
📖 The Verses in Full
الآيَة (32): يُرِيدُونَ أَن يُطْفِئُوا نُورَ اللَّهِ بِأَفْوَاهِهِمْ وَيَأْبَى اللَّهُ إِلَّا أَن يُتِمَّ نُورَهُ وَلَوْ كَرِهَ الْكَافِرُونَTranslation: "They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah refuses except to perfect His light, although the disbelievers dislike it."الآيَة (33): هُوَ الَّذِي أَرْسَلَ رَسُولَهُ بِالْهُدَىٰ وَدِينِ الْحَقِّ لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَى الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ وَلَوْ كَرِهَ الْمُشْرِكُونَTranslation: "It is He who has sent His Messenger with guidance and the religion of truth to manifest it over all religion, although the polytheists dislike it."
🔦 The Metaphor of Divine Light (Verse 32)
This verse poetically summarizes the preceding conflict.
Element Interpretation Connection to the Passage "They want to extinguish the light of Allah" The "light" is the guidance of Islam—the Qur'an and the Prophet's message. The opponents try to "extinguish" it through verbal arguments, false claims, and ideological warfare ("with their mouths"), just as they made false theological claims in verses 30-31. This directly responds to the "saying from their mouths" in verse 30. Their theological deviations are an attempt to blow out the light of Tawhid. "Allah refuses except to perfect His light" This is a divine assertion of sovereign will. God Himself guarantees the preservation, propagation, and ultimate victory of His religion. It is not dependent on human effort alone. This fulfills the promise in verse 28: "God will enrich you from His bounty." The jizya and the success of the Islamic state are part of this "perfecting" of the light.
This verse poetically summarizes the preceding conflict.
| Element | Interpretation | Connection to the Passage |
|---|---|---|
| "They want to extinguish the light of Allah" | The "light" is the guidance of Islam—the Qur'an and the Prophet's message. The opponents try to "extinguish" it through verbal arguments, false claims, and ideological warfare ("with their mouths"), just as they made false theological claims in verses 30-31. | This directly responds to the "saying from their mouths" in verse 30. Their theological deviations are an attempt to blow out the light of Tawhid. |
| "Allah refuses except to perfect His light" | This is a divine assertion of sovereign will. God Himself guarantees the preservation, propagation, and ultimate victory of His religion. It is not dependent on human effort alone. | This fulfills the promise in verse 28: "God will enrich you from His bounty." The jizya and the success of the Islamic state are part of this "perfecting" of the light. |
⚖️ The Manifestation Over All Religion (Verse 33): A Spectrum of Interpretations
The phrase "لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَى الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ" ("to manifest it over all religion") was understood by the classical scholars in several complementary ways, not as a single, monolithic command for military conquest.
Interpretation Proponents (from Ṭabarī & Baghawī) 🧭 Meaning & Historical Application 1. Eschatological Triumph Abū Hurayrah, Al-Ḍaḥḥāk This will be fully realized at the End of Times with the return of Jesus, when all people will voluntarily enter Islam. This is a future, divine act. 2. Comprehensive Knowledge Ibn `Abbās The "him" refers to the Messenger. God would "manifest him upon the entire religion," meaning teach him all the laws and rulings of the religion, leaving nothing hidden from him. This is about the perfection of revelation. 3. Intellectual & Spiritual Supremacy Al-Ḥusayn bin al-Faḍl To manifest the religion "by clear proofs" (bi al-ḥujaj al-wāḍiḥah). Victory through the power of its argument and spiritual truth. 4. Political & Legal Supremacy Imam Al-Shāfiʿī (in Baghawī) This is the interpretation that matches the Rashidun model. Al-Shāfiʿī explains: "He made His Messenger prevail over all religions in two ways:
• Over the polytheists (al-Ummiyyīn): He subdued them until they entered Islam, willingly or unwillingly.
• Over the People of the Book: He fought them, until some entered Islam, and some gave the jizya, subdued, and His rule was applied to them.
This is its manifestation over all religion."
The phrase "لِيُظْهِرَهُ عَلَى الدِّينِ كُلِّهِ" ("to manifest it over all religion") was understood by the classical scholars in several complementary ways, not as a single, monolithic command for military conquest.
| Interpretation | Proponents (from Ṭabarī & Baghawī) | 🧭 Meaning & Historical Application |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Eschatological Triumph | Abū Hurayrah, Al-Ḍaḥḥāk | This will be fully realized at the End of Times with the return of Jesus, when all people will voluntarily enter Islam. This is a future, divine act. |
| 2. Comprehensive Knowledge | Ibn `Abbās | The "him" refers to the Messenger. God would "manifest him upon the entire religion," meaning teach him all the laws and rulings of the religion, leaving nothing hidden from him. This is about the perfection of revelation. |
| 3. Intellectual & Spiritual Supremacy | Al-Ḥusayn bin al-Faḍl | To manifest the religion "by clear proofs" (bi al-ḥujaj al-wāḍiḥah). Victory through the power of its argument and spiritual truth. |
| 4. Political & Legal Supremacy | Imam Al-Shāfiʿī (in Baghawī) | This is the interpretation that matches the Rashidun model. Al-Shāfiʿī explains: "He made His Messenger prevail over all religions in two ways: • Over the polytheists (al-Ummiyyīn): He subdued them until they entered Islam, willingly or unwillingly. • Over the People of the Book: He fought them, until some entered Islam, and some gave the jizya, subdued, and His rule was applied to them. This is its manifestation over all religion." |
✅ The Verdict of History: How the Rashidun Understood "Victory"
The policies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs are the ultimate tafsir (interpretation) of these verses. They reveal a victory defined by sovereignty and justice, not annihilation.
Caliph Policy & Action How It "Manifests Islam over all Religion" Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq • Honored all existing treaties with non-Muslim communities.
• Sent armies that accepted jizya from surrendering cities like al-Hīra and Damascus. Victory was achieved by establishing Islamic political authority, not by demanding conversion. The "light" was perfected by creating a state where God's law was sovereign. `Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb • Systematized the jizya into a fair, predictable tax.
• Guaranteed protection (dhimma) for life, property, and worship.
• Did not force conversion; allowed diverse communities to flourish under Islamic rule. This is the practical manifestation of Verse 33. Islam was "made manifest" by becoming the supreme governing framework. Non-Muslims lived securely under its sovereignty, their subordinate political status marked by the jizya. This is the "perfected light." Uthman ibn Affān Continued the systems of his predecessors, consolidating the empire and allowing conquered populations to maintain their faith and social structures under Islamic law. The victory was institutionalized. The "religion of truth" was manifest in the day-to-day administration of a vast, multi-faith empire.
Conclusion: The "manifestation over all religion" promised in the Qur'an was realized by the Rashidun not as a theological tyranny, but as the establishment of a just political order under Islamic sovereignty. The jizya was the fiscal instrument of this new order. The "perfected light" was a state where the truth of Tawhid was the foundation of public life, and other faiths were accommodated through a protected, tributary status. The critics who see these verses as a call for holy war ignore the very history that proves otherwise—a history where victory was measured in treaties, tax registers, and covenants of protection.
The policies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs are the ultimate tafsir (interpretation) of these verses. They reveal a victory defined by sovereignty and justice, not annihilation.
| Caliph | Policy & Action | How It "Manifests Islam over all Religion" |
|---|---|---|
| Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq | • Honored all existing treaties with non-Muslim communities. • Sent armies that accepted jizya from surrendering cities like al-Hīra and Damascus. | Victory was achieved by establishing Islamic political authority, not by demanding conversion. The "light" was perfected by creating a state where God's law was sovereign. |
| `Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb | • Systematized the jizya into a fair, predictable tax. • Guaranteed protection (dhimma) for life, property, and worship. • Did not force conversion; allowed diverse communities to flourish under Islamic rule. | This is the practical manifestation of Verse 33. Islam was "made manifest" by becoming the supreme governing framework. Non-Muslims lived securely under its sovereignty, their subordinate political status marked by the jizya. This is the "perfected light." |
| Uthman ibn Affān | Continued the systems of his predecessors, consolidating the empire and allowing conquered populations to maintain their faith and social structures under Islamic law. | The victory was institutionalized. The "religion of truth" was manifest in the day-to-day administration of a vast, multi-faith empire. |
Conclusion: The "manifestation over all religion" promised in the Qur'an was realized by the Rashidun not as a theological tyranny, but as the establishment of a just political order under Islamic sovereignty. The jizya was the fiscal instrument of this new order. The "perfected light" was a state where the truth of Tawhid was the foundation of public life, and other faiths were accommodated through a protected, tributary status. The critics who see these verses as a call for holy war ignore the very history that proves otherwise—a history where victory was measured in treaties, tax registers, and covenants of protection.
🧩 The Master Argument: Qur'an 9:28-33 in Perfect Cohesion
The passage does not begin with a command to fight. It begins with a financial anxiety and ends with a divine promise. The command for jizya is the pragmatic, political solution placed perfectly in the middle of this theological and economic framework.
Verse 🕋 Thematic Block 📜 Core Message ➡️ Logical Flow & Historical Manifestation 9:28 🛑 The Separation & The Anxiety
"...do not let them approach the Sacred Mosque... And if you fear poverty..." Establishes a specific, limited ruling that creates an economic problem: cutting off trade with polytheists threatens Muslim livelihoods. The Problem Posed: The community's survival is at stake. This is not a abstract theological discussion, but a matter of daily bread. 9:29 ⚔️ The Political Solution
"Fight those... from among the People of the Book... until they give the jizya..." Provides the limited, conditional political and fiscal resolution to the problem. It is not a war of annihilation, but a war for a treaty and a tax. The Solution Offered: The jizya is the "until" – the stopping condition. It is the mechanism to end hostilities and establish a new relationship, replacing the lost income from the polytheists (v.28). 9:30-31 ⚖️ The Theological Justification
"The Jews say 'Uzayr is the son of God'... They have taken their rabbis and monks as lords..." Explains WHY this specific subset of People of the Book are being fought: they have committed ideological aggression by deifying humans and transferring legislative sovereignty from God to their clergy. The Cause for Conflict: The fight is not against "unbelief," but against a rival political-theological system guilty of shirk. This justifies the specific target in v.29. 9:32-33 🌅 The Divine Assurance
"They want to extinguish the light of Allah... but Allah refuses except to perfect His light... to manifest it over all religion." Places the entire conflict in a cosmic context. The victory of Islam is a divine promise, ensuring the community that their success is guaranteed by God, not just their own efforts. The Promise & The Outcome: This assures the Muslims that the jizya system (the practical outcome) is part of God's plan to "perfect His light." The triumph is one of truth and sovereignty.
| Verse | 🕋 Thematic Block | 📜 Core Message | ➡️ Logical Flow & Historical Manifestation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9:28 | 🛑 The Separation & The Anxiety "...do not let them approach the Sacred Mosque... And if you fear poverty..." | Establishes a specific, limited ruling that creates an economic problem: cutting off trade with polytheists threatens Muslim livelihoods. | The Problem Posed: The community's survival is at stake. This is not a abstract theological discussion, but a matter of daily bread. |
| 9:29 | ⚔️ The Political Solution "Fight those... from among the People of the Book... until they give the jizya..." | Provides the limited, conditional political and fiscal resolution to the problem. It is not a war of annihilation, but a war for a treaty and a tax. | The Solution Offered: The jizya is the "until" – the stopping condition. It is the mechanism to end hostilities and establish a new relationship, replacing the lost income from the polytheists (v.28). |
| 9:30-31 | ⚖️ The Theological Justification "The Jews say 'Uzayr is the son of God'... They have taken their rabbis and monks as lords..." | Explains WHY this specific subset of People of the Book are being fought: they have committed ideological aggression by deifying humans and transferring legislative sovereignty from God to their clergy. | The Cause for Conflict: The fight is not against "unbelief," but against a rival political-theological system guilty of shirk. This justifies the specific target in v.29. |
| 9:32-33 | 🌅 The Divine Assurance "They want to extinguish the light of Allah... but Allah refuses except to perfect His light... to manifest it over all religion." | Places the entire conflict in a cosmic context. The victory of Islam is a divine promise, ensuring the community that their success is guaranteed by God, not just their own efforts. | The Promise & The Outcome: This assures the Muslims that the jizya system (the practical outcome) is part of God's plan to "perfect His light." The triumph is one of truth and sovereignty. |
🏛️ How the Prophetic and Rashidun Model Fulfilled This Cohesive Argument
The historical application of these verses by the early Muslim state is a perfect mirror of their logical structure.
Quranic Logic Historical Implementation by the Prophet & Caliphs 1. The "Until" Clause (v.29) was taken literally. The moment a community offered jizya, fighting stopped. This is documented in dozens of treaties: Tabuk, Ayla, Damascus, al-Hīra. The jizya was the price of peace. 2. The "Subset" was defined by political reality. They did not fight all Christians and Jews. They fought belligerent polities (the Roman Empire, hostile Jewish tribes). Peaceful communities like Najran were granted treaties. Later, the category was pragmatically expanded to include Zoroastrians. 3. The "Jizya" was a formal contract, not humiliation. The jizya was one half of the Dhimma Covenant. The other half was the state's obligation to protect life, property, and freedom of worship. This was a business-like, administrative relationship, as seen in Umar's standardized tax system. 4. The "Light" was perfected through justice, not tyranny. The "manifestation over all religion" (v.33) was achieved by establishing Islamic sovereignty as the supreme law of the land. Non-Muslims lived under this sovereignty as protected subjects, their rights enshrined in law. This was the "perfected light"—a just, multi-faith empire, not a forced conversion camp.
| Quranic Logic | Historical Implementation by the Prophet & Caliphs |
|---|---|
| 1. The "Until" Clause (v.29) was taken literally. | The moment a community offered jizya, fighting stopped. This is documented in dozens of treaties: Tabuk, Ayla, Damascus, al-Hīra. The jizya was the price of peace. |
| 2. The "Subset" was defined by political reality. | They did not fight all Christians and Jews. They fought belligerent polities (the Roman Empire, hostile Jewish tribes). Peaceful communities like Najran were granted treaties. Later, the category was pragmatically expanded to include Zoroastrians. |
| 3. The "Jizya" was a formal contract, not humiliation. | The jizya was one half of the Dhimma Covenant. The other half was the state's obligation to protect life, property, and freedom of worship. This was a business-like, administrative relationship, as seen in Umar's standardized tax system. |
| 4. The "Light" was perfected through justice, not tyranny. | The "manifestation over all religion" (v.33) was achieved by establishing Islamic sovereignty as the supreme law of the land. Non-Muslims lived under this sovereignty as protected subjects, their rights enshrined in law. This was the "perfected light"—a just, multi-faith empire, not a forced conversion camp. |
✅ The Ultimate Conclusion: What the "Jizya Verses" Really Reveal
When read as a whole, Qur'an 9:28-33 reveals a sophisticated and principled approach to statecraft:
It is Pragmatic: It addresses a real economic crisis (v.28) with a real fiscal solution (v.29).
It is Limited: The command to fight is restricted to a specific, belligerent group defined by their ideological and political aggression (v.30-31).
It is Contractual: The jizya is not a punishment; it is the consideration for a binding contract of protection, ending the state of war.
It is Theological: The entire process is framed as a divine project to establish God's truth and sovereignty on Earth (v.32-33), which is fulfilled through justice, not oppression.
The "Coin of Conscience" was, therefore, the tangible expression of a complex covenant. It was the financial bridge from a state of war to a state of peace, from economic anxiety to divine provision, and from polytheistic hegemony to a new world order under the sovereignty of the One God. The Prophet and the Rashidun Caliphs were not mere conquerors; they were the executors of a divine blueprint for a viable, pluralistic, and just civilization.
It is Pragmatic: It addresses a real economic crisis (v.28) with a real fiscal solution (v.29).
It is Limited: The command to fight is restricted to a specific, belligerent group defined by their ideological and political aggression (v.30-31).
It is Contractual: The jizya is not a punishment; it is the consideration for a binding contract of protection, ending the state of war.
It is Theological: The entire process is framed as a divine project to establish God's truth and sovereignty on Earth (v.32-33), which is fulfilled through justice, not oppression.
ↂ The Historical Context: The Exhausted Roman Empire (c. 630 CE)
The Qur'anic commands in Surah 9:28-31 were not revealed in a vacuum. They were a divine intervention at a precise historical moment, targeting a specific superpower: the Roman Empire, which was reeling from a near-fatal quarter-century war with Persia and was internally fractured. The early Muslim community understood the command to fight as a directive against this specific, weakened imperial structure.
⚔️ The State of the Roman Empire on the Eve of Conquest
Walter Kaegi's research reveals an empire on the brink, a "wrenching experience" that left it "fiscally, psychologically, and militarily unstable and potentially volatile."
Aspect of the Empire 💔 Condition c. 630 CE (per Kaegi) 🎯 Implication for Muslim Conquests 🩸 Military Exhaustion • Recent War: 25 years of total war with Persia (603-628 CE).
• Army Size: Estimated 109,000–130,000 total troops, stretched from Italy to Egypt.
• Syrian Front: Perhaps only 5,000 regular troops in Palestine/Syria south of Chalcis.
• Quality: Garrisons were "mediocre," suited only for "passive, low-intensity stationary guard duty." The Muslim armies faced a thinly spread, war-weary opponent, not an invincible legion. The "belligerent subset" was a hollowed-out imperial frontier force. 💸 Fiscal Crisis • Bankrupt Treasury: Heraclius melted church plate and bronze monuments in Constantinople for cash.
• Logistical Breakdown: The system of paying soldiers in kind (annonae) was strained, leading to mutiny and unrest.
• Unpaid Allies: Roman Arab allies near Gaza were refused their stipends, causing desertions. The Roman state could not fund its own defense. The promise in Qur'an 9:28—"If you fear poverty, Allah will enrich you from His bounty"—was fulfilled by the jizya (9:29), which replaced the empire's broken fiscal system with a sustainable Islamic one. 🧩 Religious & Social Fractures • Doctrinal Strife: Heraclius failed to reconcile the Miaphysite (Syria, Egypt) and Chalcedonian churches.
• Alienated Populations: The empire was a patchwork of Syriac, Coptic, and Armenian speakers with tense relations with the Greek-speaking center. The Qur'an's condemnation of taking "rabbis and monks as lords" (9:31) resonated with populations who saw the imperial church as a corrupt, foreign imposition. The Islamic call to pure monotheism was an attractive alternative.
| Aspect of the Empire | 💔 Condition c. 630 CE (per Kaegi) | 🎯 Implication for Muslim Conquests |
|---|---|---|
| 🩸 Military Exhaustion | • Recent War: 25 years of total war with Persia (603-628 CE). • Army Size: Estimated 109,000–130,000 total troops, stretched from Italy to Egypt. • Syrian Front: Perhaps only 5,000 regular troops in Palestine/Syria south of Chalcis. • Quality: Garrisons were "mediocre," suited only for "passive, low-intensity stationary guard duty." | The Muslim armies faced a thinly spread, war-weary opponent, not an invincible legion. The "belligerent subset" was a hollowed-out imperial frontier force. |
| 💸 Fiscal Crisis | • Bankrupt Treasury: Heraclius melted church plate and bronze monuments in Constantinople for cash. • Logistical Breakdown: The system of paying soldiers in kind (annonae) was strained, leading to mutiny and unrest. • Unpaid Allies: Roman Arab allies near Gaza were refused their stipends, causing desertions. | The Roman state could not fund its own defense. The promise in Qur'an 9:28—"If you fear poverty, Allah will enrich you from His bounty"—was fulfilled by the jizya (9:29), which replaced the empire's broken fiscal system with a sustainable Islamic one. |
| 🧩 Religious & Social Fractures | • Doctrinal Strife: Heraclius failed to reconcile the Miaphysite (Syria, Egypt) and Chalcedonian churches. • Alienated Populations: The empire was a patchwork of Syriac, Coptic, and Armenian speakers with tense relations with the Greek-speaking center. | The Qur'an's condemnation of taking "rabbis and monks as lords" (9:31) resonated with populations who saw the imperial church as a corrupt, foreign imposition. The Islamic call to pure monotheism was an attractive alternative. |
🗺️ The Geopolitical Target: The "Belligerent Subset" was the Roman State
The criteria in Qur'an 9:29 perfectly describe the late Roman Empire's political and theological stance.
Qur'anic Condition in 9:29 🏛️ How the Roman Empire Embodied This "Do not believe in God... nor the Last Day" The Empire's state Christology (Chalcedonian/Monothelete), which the Qur'an deemed a deviation into shirk (9:30-31), constituted a "disbelief" in pure monotheism. "Do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden" The Empire's own legal and moral codes (Roman Law, Church canons) had replaced the divine law believed to be revealed to previous prophets. "Do not follow the religion of truth" The Empire, from an Islamic perspective, was not following the true, uncorrupted religion of God (Islam) but a man-made imperial faith.
✅ Conclusion: The "belligerent subset" from "among those who were given the Scripture" was the Roman imperial state apparatus itself—its army, its tax collectors, and its ecclesiastical hierarchy—which was actively imposing its heretical (from the Islamic view) sovereignty over the land.
| Qur'anic Condition in 9:29 | 🏛️ How the Roman Empire Embodied This |
|---|---|
| "Do not believe in God... nor the Last Day" | The Empire's state Christology (Chalcedonian/Monothelete), which the Qur'an deemed a deviation into shirk (9:30-31), constituted a "disbelief" in pure monotheism. |
| "Do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden" | The Empire's own legal and moral codes (Roman Law, Church canons) had replaced the divine law believed to be revealed to previous prophets. |
| "Do not follow the religion of truth" | The Empire, from an Islamic perspective, was not following the true, uncorrupted religion of God (Islam) but a man-made imperial faith. |
✅ Conclusion: The "belligerent subset" from "among those who were given the Scripture" was the Roman imperial state apparatus itself—its army, its tax collectors, and its ecclesiastical hierarchy—which was actively imposing its heretical (from the Islamic view) sovereignty over the land.
➡️ The Logical Flow from Revelation to Conquest
The Qur'anic passage provides a complete ideological and practical roadmap for dealing with the Roman Empire.
Qur'anic Stage Divine Command Historical Application against Rome 1. Separation (v. 28) Separate from the polytheists (mushrikūn); God will provide. The Muslim community separates from the Meccan pagans. The promise of provision is about to be fulfilled. 2. Confrontation (v. 29) Fight the belligerent Scriptural group until they pay jizya. The Muslims engage the Roman frontier armies at Dāthin, Ajnādayn, and Fihl, implementing this command. 3. Justification (v. 30) They have committed shirk (claiming sons for God). This is the theological critique of Roman state Christology, the empire's foundational ideology. 4. Mechanism (v. 31) They have taken their clergy as lords besides God. This exposes the corrupt power structure of the Empire, where the state church legislates contrary to divine law.
| Qur'anic Stage | Divine Command | Historical Application against Rome |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Separation (v. 28) | Separate from the polytheists (mushrikūn); God will provide. | The Muslim community separates from the Meccan pagans. The promise of provision is about to be fulfilled. |
| 2. Confrontation (v. 29) | Fight the belligerent Scriptural group until they pay jizya. | The Muslims engage the Roman frontier armies at Dāthin, Ajnādayn, and Fihl, implementing this command. |
| 3. Justification (v. 30) | They have committed shirk (claiming sons for God). | This is the theological critique of Roman state Christology, the empire's foundational ideology. |
| 4. Mechanism (v. 31) | They have taken their clergy as lords besides God. | This exposes the corrupt power structure of the Empire, where the state church legislates contrary to divine law. |
🤝 The Result: Jizya as a Superior Imperial Contract
The early Islamic system, as we have documented from the treaties, was not more oppressive, but more efficient and principled than the Roman system it replaced.
System Roman Fiscal-Military Model (c. 630) Early Islamic Model (Post-Conquest) 💸 Revenue Collection Broken. Unpaid soldiers, melted church plate, resentful taxpayers. Systematic. Standardized jizya and kharaj (1 dinar + 1 jarīb of wheat). Predictable and sustainable. 🛡️ Soldier Payment Unreliable. Led to mutiny and desertion, especially among Arab allies. Reliable. Stipends (ʿaṭāʾ) from the Dīwān ensured a loyal, professional army. ⚖️ Social Contract Fractured. Imposed religious uniformity, causing internal strife. Covenantal. The dhimma contract guaranteed life, property, and religious freedom for a fixed tax.
Final Conclusion: The "Verses of Tribute" were a specific divine command to confront a specific empire at its moment of maximum weakness and internal contradiction. The early Caliphate's brilliant success lay in executing this command not with wanton destruction, but by replacing a failed Roman imperial system with a more robust, pragmatic, and ethically grounded fiscal state. The "Coin of Conscience" was the currency of this new order, replacing the broken bronze and empty promises of Rome.
| System | Roman Fiscal-Military Model (c. 630) | Early Islamic Model (Post-Conquest) |
|---|---|---|
| 💸 Revenue Collection | Broken. Unpaid soldiers, melted church plate, resentful taxpayers. | Systematic. Standardized jizya and kharaj (1 dinar + 1 jarīb of wheat). Predictable and sustainable. |
| 🛡️ Soldier Payment | Unreliable. Led to mutiny and desertion, especially among Arab allies. | Reliable. Stipends (ʿaṭāʾ) from the Dīwān ensured a loyal, professional army. |
| ⚖️ Social Contract | Fractured. Imposed religious uniformity, causing internal strife. | Covenantal. The dhimma contract guaranteed life, property, and religious freedom for a fixed tax. |
⚖️ The Legal Reality vs. The Imperial Reality: Who Pays Jizya?
Al-Baghawi’s section reveals a deep tension in Islamic law. The Qur'an 9:29 explicitly mentions only the "People of the Book" (أهل الكتاب). But within decades, the Caliphate ruled over millions of Zoroastrians, Berbers, and others who did not fit this category. The jurists of the Abbasid era were left to debate what the founders of the empire had already done as a matter of pragmatic statecraft.
📜 The Classical Legal Debate (as per Al-Baghawi)
School / Jurist 💬 Legal Opinion on Who Pays Jizya 🧠 Rationale Al-Shāfiʿī تؤخذ من أهل الكتاب عربا كانوا أو عجما
Taken from the People of the Book, whether they are Arabs or non-Arabs. Based on religion, not ethnicity. He cites the Prophet taking jizya from the Arab Christian Ukaydir of Duma and the Arabs of Yemen. Mālik & Al-Awzāʿī تؤخذ من جميع الكفار إلا المرتد
Taken from all disbelievers except the apostate. The most expansive view. It is a political tax on all non-Muslim subjects, reflecting the reality of a diverse empire. Abū Ḥanīfa تؤخذ من أهل الكتاب على العموم ، وتؤخذ من مشركي العجم ، ولا تؤخذ من مشركي العرب
Taken from People of the Book generally, and from non-Arab polytheists, but not from Arab polytheists. A confusing ethnic distinction that privileges Arab polytheists over non-Arab ones. Abū Yūsuf لا تؤخذ من العربي ، كتابيا كان أو مشركا ، وتؤخذ من العجمي كتابيا كان أو مشركا
Not taken from an Arab, whether from the Book or a polytheist, but taken from a non-Arab, whether from the Book or a polytheist. An even stricter ethnic-based policy that is completely unworkable for a multi-ethnic empire.
| School / Jurist | 💬 Legal Opinion on Who Pays Jizya | 🧠 Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Al-Shāfiʿī | تؤخذ من أهل الكتاب عربا كانوا أو عجما Taken from the People of the Book, whether they are Arabs or non-Arabs. | Based on religion, not ethnicity. He cites the Prophet taking jizya from the Arab Christian Ukaydir of Duma and the Arabs of Yemen. |
| Mālik & Al-Awzāʿī | تؤخذ من جميع الكفار إلا المرتد Taken from all disbelievers except the apostate. | The most expansive view. It is a political tax on all non-Muslim subjects, reflecting the reality of a diverse empire. |
| Abū Ḥanīfa | تؤخذ من أهل الكتاب على العموم ، وتؤخذ من مشركي العجم ، ولا تؤخذ من مشركي العرب Taken from People of the Book generally, and from non-Arab polytheists, but not from Arab polytheists. | A confusing ethnic distinction that privileges Arab polytheists over non-Arab ones. |
| Abū Yūsuf | لا تؤخذ من العربي ، كتابيا كان أو مشركا ، وتؤخذ من العجمي كتابيا كان أو مشركا Not taken from an Arab, whether from the Book or a polytheist, but taken from a non-Arab, whether from the Book or a polytheist. | An even stricter ethnic-based policy that is completely unworkable for a multi-ethnic empire. |
✅ The Historical Reality: What the Early Caliphs Actually Did
The conquests under Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman created facts on the ground that made these later debates largely academic. The early state's policy was pragmatic, inclusive, and focused on political submission.
Conquered Population Faith Qur'anic Category? Historical Treatment by Early Caliphs Christians of Syria, Egypt, Armenia Christianity ✅ أهل الكتاب (People of the Book) PAID JIZYA. Treated under the Damascus/Busra model (1 dinar + supplies). Jews of Mesopotamia & Persia Judaism ✅ أهل الكتاب (People of the Book) PAID JIZYA. Included in the treaties of al-Hīra and the Sawad. Zoroastrians of Persia (Majūs) Zoroastrianism ❌ Not explicitly mentioned. PAID JIZYA. As Al-Baghawi himself notes: "أما المجوس : فاتفقت الصحابة رضي الله عنهم على أخذ الجزية منهم" ("As for the Magians, the Companions agreed unanimously on taking the jizya from them.") This was based on the Prophet's precedent with the Magians of Hajar. Berbers of North Africa Traditional / Christian ❌ Not أهل الكتاب. PAID JIZYA. Al-Ṭabarī states: "ʿUthmān collected it from the Berbers." The Caliphate needed to formalize rule, and taxation was the mechanism. Buddhists, Hindus, etc. of the East Buddhism, Hinduism ❌ Not أهل الكتاب. PAID JIZYA. As the conquests pushed into Sindh and beyond, the administrative system of kharaj and jizya was applied to these populations. The state could not leave vast, wealthy regions untaxed based on a technicality.
| Conquered Population | Faith | Qur'anic Category? | Historical Treatment by Early Caliphs |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christians of Syria, Egypt, Armenia | Christianity | ✅ أهل الكتاب (People of the Book) | PAID JIZYA. Treated under the Damascus/Busra model (1 dinar + supplies). |
| Jews of Mesopotamia & Persia | Judaism | ✅ أهل الكتاب (People of the Book) | PAID JIZYA. Included in the treaties of al-Hīra and the Sawad. |
| Zoroastrians of Persia (Majūs) | Zoroastrianism | ❌ Not explicitly mentioned. | PAID JIZYA. As Al-Baghawi himself notes: "أما المجوس : فاتفقت الصحابة رضي الله عنهم على أخذ الجزية منهم" ("As for the Magians, the Companions agreed unanimously on taking the jizya from them.") This was based on the Prophet's precedent with the Magians of Hajar. |
| Berbers of North Africa | Traditional / Christian | ❌ Not أهل الكتاب. | PAID JIZYA. Al-Ṭabarī states: "ʿUthmān collected it from the Berbers." The Caliphate needed to formalize rule, and taxation was the mechanism. |
| Buddhists, Hindus, etc. of the East | Buddhism, Hinduism | ❌ Not أهل الكتاب. | PAID JIZYA. As the conquests pushed into Sindh and beyond, the administrative system of kharaj and jizya was applied to these populations. The state could not leave vast, wealthy regions untaxed based on a technicality. |
🧩 The Critical Precedent: The Magians of Hajar
The case of the Zoroastrians is the key that unlocked the entire system. Al-Baghawi records the crucial incident:
أخبرنا عبد الوهاب بن محمد الخطيب... أخبرنا الشافعي ، أخبرنا سفيان عن عمرو بن دينار سمع بجالة يقول : لم يكن عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه أخذ الجزية من المجوس حتى شهد عبد الرحمن بن عوف أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أخذها من مجوس هجر
"We were informed... from Al-Shafi'i... from Sufyan from 'Amr ibn Dinar who heard Bajala say: 'Umar ibn al-Khattab was not taking the jizya from the Magians until 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Awf testified that the Prophet had taken it from the Magians of Hajar.''
This proves two things:
Umar was initially hesitant, wanting to adhere strictly to the Qur'anic text.
The Prophetic precedent (Sunnah) overrode a narrow reading of the text. The practice of the Prophet ﷺ established that the dhimma could be extended to other communities.
This one decision became the legal basis for including tens of millions of Zoroastrians and, by analogy, many other groups.
أخبرنا عبد الوهاب بن محمد الخطيب... أخبرنا الشافعي ، أخبرنا سفيان عن عمرو بن دينار سمع بجالة يقول : لم يكن عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه أخذ الجزية من المجوس حتى شهد عبد الرحمن بن عوف أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أخذها من مجوس هجر
"We were informed... from Al-Shafi'i... from Sufyan from 'Amr ibn Dinar who heard Bajala say: 'Umar ibn al-Khattab was not taking the jizya from the Magians until 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Awf testified that the Prophet had taken it from the Magians of Hajar.''
Umar was initially hesitant, wanting to adhere strictly to the Qur'anic text.
The Prophetic precedent (Sunnah) overrode a narrow reading of the text. The practice of the Prophet ﷺ established that the dhimma could be extended to other communities.
🏛️ The Verdict: Pragmatic Statecraft Over Literal Text
The expansion of the jizya beyond the "People of the Book" was not a later corruption; it was a necessity of empire that began with the Prophet himself and was scaled up by the Rashidun Caliphs.
The Driver was Administration, Not Theology: The Caliphate needed a uniform, simple, and scalable system to manage millions of new subjects. Creating a complex set of rules for dozens of different faiths was administratively impossible. The binary choice was: conquer and expel/conquer and enslave, or conquer and tax. The jizya system was the most stable and profitable option.
The "Spirit" of the Law Prevailed: The later legal schools were trying to systematize what had already happened. The most practical opinion (Mālik & Al-Awzāʿī's—take it from all non-Muslims) best reflects the historical reality. The most restrictive (Abū Yūsuf's—only from non-Arabs) was a theoretical position that would have collapsed the empire's fiscal structure.
Conclusion: The early Islamic empire was built by men who understood that revelation provided principles, but statecraft required flexibility. The "Coin of Conscience" was ultimately a coin of political integration. By accepting it from Zoroastrians, Berbers, and others, the Caliphate was not betraying the Qur'anic verse; it was fulfilling its deeper objective—to establish a political order where diverse communities could live under a single sovereignty, their submission symbolized by a universal fiscal policy.
The Driver was Administration, Not Theology: The Caliphate needed a uniform, simple, and scalable system to manage millions of new subjects. Creating a complex set of rules for dozens of different faiths was administratively impossible. The binary choice was: conquer and expel/conquer and enslave, or conquer and tax. The jizya system was the most stable and profitable option.
The "Spirit" of the Law Prevailed: The later legal schools were trying to systematize what had already happened. The most practical opinion (Mālik & Al-Awzāʿī's—take it from all non-Muslims) best reflects the historical reality. The most restrictive (Abū Yūsuf's—only from non-Arabs) was a theoretical position that would have collapsed the empire's fiscal structure.
⚖️ The Great Anachronism: Mawardi's Ideology vs. The Rashidun Reality
The legalistic and confrontational conditions outlined by Al-Mawardi represent a mature, theoretical system developed centuries after the conquests, within the secure confines of a powerful, established empire. To impose this framework onto the early Caliphate is a profound historical error. The Rashidun state, governing millions of non-Muslims immediately after a violent conquest, operated on a principle of pragmatic consolidation, not ideological purification.
🏛️ Al-Mawardi's Abbasid Framework: The Ideology of a Dominant Empire
Al-Mawardi's system is designed for a state that has already won. Its goal is maintenance of supremacy.
"وَجْمَلَتُهُ أَنَّ الْمَقْصُودَ بِعَقْدِ الْجِزْيَةِ تَقْوِيَةُ الْإِسْلَامِ، وَإِعْزَازُهُ، وَإِضْعَافُ الْكُفْرِ وَإِذْلَالُهُ""The summary is that the objective of contracting the jizya is to strengthen Islam, honor it, and weaken disbelief and humiliate it."
From this core principle, he derives a list of conditions that, if violated, nullify the dhimma and make the non-Muslim's blood lawful.
Mawardi's Condition 🚨 Example Clause 🎯 Implied Power Dynamic Blasphemy & Proselytism "Do not mention the Book of God... or Muhammad... in an inappropriate manner." The Muslim state is so secure it can police speech and religious debate. Interfaith Relations "Do not fornicate with a Muslim woman... or seduce a Muslim away from his religion." The state actively prevents religious and social mingling to maintain communal purity. Security & Loyalty "Do not aid the people of war by guiding them against Muslims." The dhimmi population is seen as a permanent fifth column requiring monitoring. Public Religious Practice "They must not make the sound of their church bells heard." The state enforces the public invisibility of non-Islamic faiths.
This is the law of a confident, dominant power obsessed with social boundaries.
| Mawardi's Condition | 🚨 Example Clause | 🎯 Implied Power Dynamic |
|---|---|---|
| Blasphemy & Proselytism | "Do not mention the Book of God... or Muhammad... in an inappropriate manner." | The Muslim state is so secure it can police speech and religious debate. |
| Interfaith Relations | "Do not fornicate with a Muslim woman... or seduce a Muslim away from his religion." | The state actively prevents religious and social mingling to maintain communal purity. |
| Security & Loyalty | "Do not aid the people of war by guiding them against Muslims." | The dhimmi population is seen as a permanent fifth column requiring monitoring. |
| Public Religious Practice | "They must not make the sound of their church bells heard." | The state enforces the public invisibility of non-Islamic faiths. |
⚔️ The Rashidun Reality: The Pragmatism of a Fragile Conquest State
Now, let's contrast this with the actual situation of the Rashidun Caliphate, especially under Umar, as they managed the newly conquered territories.
Reality of the 7th Century Caliphate 🎯 Practical Imperative ➡️ Contradiction with Mawardi's Model Demographic Inferiority: Muslims were a tiny ruling elite (Arabs) governing vast millions of Romans, Persians, Copts, and Arameans. SURVIVAL. Provoking mass rebellion through cultural and religious oppression would have been suicidal. Mawardi's rules would have sparked constant revolts. The Caliphate could not afford to police every church bell or private conversation. Military Overextension: Armies were stretched from Libya to Afghanistan, fighting on multiple fronts. STABILITY. The home front needed to be pacified and productive to fund the wars. The last thing Umar needed was to create internal enemies by forbidding the dhimmis from their normal lives. His goal was revenue and order, not ideological purity. Economic Dependence: The entire state apparatus—stipends for soldiers, pensions, infrastructure—ran on Kharaj and Jizya from non-Muslims. REVENUE. The system required the dhimmi population to be economically productive and compliant. If you execute or antagonize your taxpayers for blasphemy, you bankrupt the state. A dead or rebellious dhimmi pays no jizya. Administrative Continuity: The Caliphate lacked the manpower to administer the complex Byzantine and Sasanian bureaucracies. They relied on the existing non-Muslim civil servants. GOVERNANCE. The tax registers were run by Coptic, Greek, and Persian Christians. The land surveys were conducted by Zoroastrian scribes. You do not threaten your own tax collectors, accountants, and engineers with execution for sounding a gong. You need them to run the empire.
| Reality of the 7th Century Caliphate | 🎯 Practical Imperative | ➡️ Contradiction with Mawardi's Model |
|---|---|---|
| Demographic Inferiority: Muslims were a tiny ruling elite (Arabs) governing vast millions of Romans, Persians, Copts, and Arameans. | SURVIVAL. Provoking mass rebellion through cultural and religious oppression would have been suicidal. | Mawardi's rules would have sparked constant revolts. The Caliphate could not afford to police every church bell or private conversation. |
| Military Overextension: Armies were stretched from Libya to Afghanistan, fighting on multiple fronts. | STABILITY. The home front needed to be pacified and productive to fund the wars. | The last thing Umar needed was to create internal enemies by forbidding the dhimmis from their normal lives. His goal was revenue and order, not ideological purity. |
| Economic Dependence: The entire state apparatus—stipends for soldiers, pensions, infrastructure—ran on Kharaj and Jizya from non-Muslims. | REVENUE. The system required the dhimmi population to be economically productive and compliant. | If you execute or antagonize your taxpayers for blasphemy, you bankrupt the state. A dead or rebellious dhimmi pays no jizya. |
| Administrative Continuity: The Caliphate lacked the manpower to administer the complex Byzantine and Sasanian bureaucracies. They relied on the existing non-Muslim civil servants. | GOVERNANCE. The tax registers were run by Coptic, Greek, and Persian Christians. The land surveys were conducted by Zoroastrian scribes. | You do not threaten your own tax collectors, accountants, and engineers with execution for sounding a gong. You need them to run the empire. |
📜 The Proof is in the Treaties: What Was Actually Written
The foundational documents of the dhimma system contain none of Mawardi's ideological conditions.
Treaty Key Clauses What is NOT Mentioned The Prophet to the Christians of Najran Protection for their lives, faith, property, and land. Freedom of religious practice. No clause against building new churches, ringing bells, or preaching. Khalid ibn al-Walid for Damascus Guarantee for their lives, property, churches, and city walls. They will be treated well as long as they pay the jizya. No clause against insulting Islam or seducing Muslims. Umar's Universal System Standardized tax rates (4 dinars/40 dirhams) and in-kind supplies (wheat, oil). No universal code of social conduct appended to the tax decree. The focus is entirely on fiscal obligation and state protection.
The early dhimma was a contract of political loyalty and fiscal obligation, not a code of social apartheid.
| Treaty | Key Clauses | What is NOT Mentioned |
|---|---|---|
| The Prophet to the Christians of Najran | Protection for their lives, faith, property, and land. Freedom of religious practice. | No clause against building new churches, ringing bells, or preaching. |
| Khalid ibn al-Walid for Damascus | Guarantee for their lives, property, churches, and city walls. They will be treated well as long as they pay the jizya. | No clause against insulting Islam or seducing Muslims. |
| Umar's Universal System | Standardized tax rates (4 dinars/40 dirhams) and in-kind supplies (wheat, oil). | No universal code of social conduct appended to the tax decree. The focus is entirely on fiscal obligation and state protection. |
The early dhimma was a contract of political loyalty and fiscal obligation, not a code of social apartheid.
🧩 The Verdict: Two Different Worlds
Aspect 🏺 The Rashidun Caliphate (7th Century) 🕌 The Abbasid Jurists (11th Century+) Primary Goal State Survival & Revenue Ideological & Social Supremacy Power Dynamic Muslims as a Vulnerable Minority Ruling a Vast Non-Muslim Majority Muslims as a Secure Majority Governing Subject Communities View of Dhimmis Tax-Paying Subjects & Essential Administrators A Potentially Subversive Population to be Controlled The "Ṣāghirūn" Clause A Description of Political Submission A Mandate for Ongoing Social Humiliation The "Jizya" The Price of Peace & Protection The Symbol of Institutionalized Inferiority
Conclusion: To read Al-Mawardi's 11th-century ideology back into the 7th-century conquests is to commit a grave historical fallacy. The Rashidun Caliphs were not building a theocratic state based on a detailed law of religious discrimination; they were pragmatic empire-builders who used a simple, flexible fiscal contract (jizya for dhimma) to stabilize their rule over a diverse and restive population. The "Coin of Conscience" in their era was a tool of integration and pacification. It was only later, when the empire was secure and the demographic balance had shifted, that jurists like Mawardi could afford to theorize about using the jizya as a tool for "weakening disbelief." The modern image of a universally applied, oppressive dhimmi code is an Abbasid-era fiction, retroactively imposed on a Rashidun history that was far more complex, pragmatic, and focused on simple governance.
| Aspect | 🏺 The Rashidun Caliphate (7th Century) | 🕌 The Abbasid Jurists (11th Century+) |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Goal | State Survival & Revenue | Ideological & Social Supremacy |
| Power Dynamic | Muslims as a Vulnerable Minority Ruling a Vast Non-Muslim Majority | Muslims as a Secure Majority Governing Subject Communities |
| View of Dhimmis | Tax-Paying Subjects & Essential Administrators | A Potentially Subversive Population to be Controlled |
| The "Ṣāghirūn" Clause | A Description of Political Submission | A Mandate for Ongoing Social Humiliation |
| The "Jizya" | The Price of Peace & Protection | The Symbol of Institutionalized Inferiority |
🏁 Conclusion: The Covenant of Coexistence — What Jizya Was Always Meant to Be
The journey through the "Page of Jizya" (Qur'an 9:28-33) and the subsequent 1,400 years of history reveals a profound and consistent truth, one that has been obscured by both the selective literalism of modern extremists and the orientalist fantasies of their detractors. The jizya was never a standalone command for humiliation or a theological warrant for perpetual war. It was, and is, the fiscal cornerstone of a sophisticated, covenant-based system of pluralistic statecraft, born from a specific revelatory context and implemented with brilliant pragmatism.
The Qur'anic passage presents a perfectly sequenced, logical argument:
🕋 The Principle of Sacred Space (v. 28): It begins not with violence, but with purification, establishing the inviolable core of the new community. The economic anxiety this creates is met with a divine promise of provision, setting the stage for the mechanism to come.
⚔️ The Limited Casus Belli (v. 29): The command to fight is meticulously restricted to a subset of the People of the Book defined by active theological and political belligerence—those whose shirk (ascribing partners to God) had become a manifest ideology of opposition.
⚖️ The Theological Justification (vs. 30-31): The reason for the confrontation is laid bare: these communities had not merely erred, but had fundamentally betrayed their covenant by deifying human figures (Ezra, Jesus) and, most critically, by transferring legislative sovereignty to their religious elites. They had taken "lords besides God" by obeying human law over divine law.
🎯 The Ultimate Goal (v. 29, "Ḥattā..."): The objective is crystal clear: not annihilation, but submission to a new political order. The moment this submission is formalized through the payment of the jizya, the legal cause for fighting ceases.
This Qur'anic blueprint was then translated into a living, breathing system by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and the Rightly Guided Caliphs. The historical record is unambiguous:
The "Ṣāghirūn" Clause became the Dhimma Covenant—a written contract guaranteeing life, property, and religious freedom.
The "From Their Hand" became the 1 Dinar or its equivalent—a standardized, predictable tax, often paid in kind with wheat and oil, as seen in the treaties of Busra, Damascus, and Hira.
The "Stopping Condition" became the basis for every surrender treaty, from the oasis of Tabuk to the capital of Damascus.
Under the administrative genius of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab, this system was scaled into a universal, centralized policy. He categorized the empire into "People of Gold" and "People of Silver," locking the jizya into a fixed, fair rate (4 dinars/40 dirhams) and embedding it within a comprehensive tax package that included supplies for the army. This was not the action of a state seeking to impoverish or humiliate, but of one building a sustainable, multi-ethnic, multi-religious empire on a foundation of predictable law and revenue.
The subsequent debates between the great jurists—Al-Shafi'i's textualist restriction to Scriptuaries versus the pragmatic inclusion of all non-Muslims by Malik and Abu Hanifa—were largely theoretical for centuries. In the real-world laboratories of empire, especially on the frontiers of Transoxiana and India, pragmatism always won. Commanders like Muhammad bin Qasim extended the dhimma to Hindus and Buddhists, understanding that the "Coin of Conscience" was ultimately a tool for peace, stability, and the facilitation of da'wah, not a weapon of coercion.
The modern, weaponized interpretation of Qur'an 9:29 is thus a double heresy. It is a heresy against the text itself, ripping a single verse from the body of its revelatory context. And it is a heresy against history, ignoring the vast, documented tapestry of treaties, tax registers, and administrative manuals that show the early Islamic state was built on the Covenant of Coexistence, not the cult of the sword.
The jizya was the price of peace, the tangible token of a sacred contract. It was the material expression of a divine promise to enrich the believers, not with plunder, but with a system of justice that could embrace the Other without absorbing them. To reduce this profound civilizational project to a caricature of "convert, pay, or die" is to betray the conscience that the coin itself was meant to represent.
THE END
Works Cited
📚 Primary Sources (Translated & Original)
ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī. Al-Muṣannaf. Edited by Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān al-Aʿẓamī, al-Majlis al-ʿIlmī, 1970-1972. 11 vols.
Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit. Kitāb al-Āthār. Translated by Abdassamad Clarke, Turath Publishing, 2006.
al-Baghawī, al-Ḥusayn ibn Masʿūd. Maʿālim al-Tanzīl fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh al-Nimr et al., 4th ed., Dār Ṭaybah, 1997. 8 vols.
al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā. History of the Arab Invasions: The Conquest of the Lands. A New Translation of al-Balādhurī’s Futūḥ al-Buldān. Translated and with historical commentary by Hugh Kennedy, I.B. Tauris, 2022.
Ibn Qudāmah, Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad. Al-Mughnī. Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1985. 10 vols.
John, Bishop of Nikiu. The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu. Translated by R.H. Charles, Text and Translation Society, 1916.
Mālik ibn Anas. Al-Muwaṭṭaʾ. Translated by Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley, Diwan Press, 2014.
al-Māwardī, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad. Al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr fī Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1999. 18 vols.
---. Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, n.d.
al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs. Al-Umm. Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1990. 8 vols.
Sebeos. The Armenian History Attributed to Sebeos. Translated by R.W. Thomson, with historical commentary by James Howard-Johnston and assistance from Tim Greenwood, Liverpool UP, 1999. Translated Texts for Historians, vol. 31.
al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr. Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Taʾwīl Āy al-Qurʾān. Dār al-Tarbiyah wa-al-Turāth, n.d. 24 vols.
The Chronicle of Zuqnīn, Parts III and IV: A.D. 488–775. Translated from Syriac with notes and introduction by Amir Harrak, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999. Mediaeval Sources in Translation, vol. 36.
al-Ḥamawī, Yāqūt. Muʿjam al-Buldān. 2nd ed., Dār Ṣādir, 1995. 7 vols.
📖 Secondary Sources
Daryaee, Touraj. Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. I.B. Tauris, 2023.
Grierson, Philip. Byzantine Coinage. 2nd ed., Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1999.
Hoyland, Robert G. Seeing Islam as Others Saw It: A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam. Gorgias Press, 2019.
Kaegi, Walter E. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge UP, 1992.
Kennedy, Hugh. The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State. Routledge, 2001.
Levy-Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence. Cambridge University Press, 2011. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization.
Newby, Gordon Darnell. A History of the Jews of Arabia: From Ancient Times to Their Eclipse Under Islam. U of South Carolina P, 1988.
Penn, Michael Philip. When Christians First Met Muslims: A Sourcebook of the Earliest Syriac Writings on Islam. University of California Press, 2015.
Petersen, Leif Inge Ree. Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States (400-800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam.* Brill, 2013.
Sear, David R. Byzantine Coins and Their Values. 2nd ed., revised and enlarged, with the collaboration of Simon Bendall and Michael Dennis O'Hara, B.A. Seaby Ltd., 1987.
Sijpesteijn, Petra M. Shaping a Muslim State: The World of a Mid-Eighth-Century Egyptian Official. Oxford University Press, 2013.
📚 Primary Sources (Translated & Original)
ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī. Al-Muṣannaf. Edited by Ḥabīb al-Raḥmān al-Aʿẓamī, al-Majlis al-ʿIlmī, 1970-1972. 11 vols.
Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit. Kitāb al-Āthār. Translated by Abdassamad Clarke, Turath Publishing, 2006.
al-Baghawī, al-Ḥusayn ibn Masʿūd. Maʿālim al-Tanzīl fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān. Edited by Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh al-Nimr et al., 4th ed., Dār Ṭaybah, 1997. 8 vols.
al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā. History of the Arab Invasions: The Conquest of the Lands. A New Translation of al-Balādhurī’s Futūḥ al-Buldān. Translated and with historical commentary by Hugh Kennedy, I.B. Tauris, 2022.
Ibn Qudāmah, Muwaffaq al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad. Al-Mughnī. Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1985. 10 vols.
John, Bishop of Nikiu. The Chronicle of John, Bishop of Nikiu. Translated by R.H. Charles, Text and Translation Society, 1916.
Mālik ibn Anas. Al-Muwaṭṭaʾ. Translated by Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley, Diwan Press, 2014.
al-Māwardī, ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad. Al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr fī Fiqh Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1999. 18 vols.
---. Al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah. Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, n.d.
al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad ibn Idrīs. Al-Umm. Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1990. 8 vols.
Sebeos. The Armenian History Attributed to Sebeos. Translated by R.W. Thomson, with historical commentary by James Howard-Johnston and assistance from Tim Greenwood, Liverpool UP, 1999. Translated Texts for Historians, vol. 31.
al-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr. Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Taʾwīl Āy al-Qurʾān. Dār al-Tarbiyah wa-al-Turāth, n.d. 24 vols.
The Chronicle of Zuqnīn, Parts III and IV: A.D. 488–775. Translated from Syriac with notes and introduction by Amir Harrak, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999. Mediaeval Sources in Translation, vol. 36.
al-Ḥamawī, Yāqūt. Muʿjam al-Buldān. 2nd ed., Dār Ṣādir, 1995. 7 vols.
📖 Secondary Sources
Daryaee, Touraj. Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire. I.B. Tauris, 2023.
Grierson, Philip. Byzantine Coinage. 2nd ed., Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1999.
Hoyland, Robert G. Seeing Islam as Others Saw It: A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian Writings on Early Islam. Gorgias Press, 2019.
Kaegi, Walter E. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge UP, 1992.
Kennedy, Hugh. The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State. Routledge, 2001.
Levy-Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence. Cambridge University Press, 2011. Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization.
Newby, Gordon Darnell. A History of the Jews of Arabia: From Ancient Times to Their Eclipse Under Islam. U of South Carolina P, 1988.
Penn, Michael Philip. When Christians First Met Muslims: A Sourcebook of the Earliest Syriac Writings on Islam. University of California Press, 2015.
Petersen, Leif Inge Ree. Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States (400-800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam.* Brill, 2013.
Sear, David R. Byzantine Coins and Their Values. 2nd ed., revised and enlarged, with the collaboration of Simon Bendall and Michael Dennis O'Hara, B.A. Seaby Ltd., 1987.
Sijpesteijn, Petra M. Shaping a Muslim State: The World of a Mid-Eighth-Century Egyptian Official. Oxford University Press, 2013.
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