"No harm Inflicted nor Reciprocated": Reclaiming the Mercy in Qur'an 65:4

"No harm shall be inflicted nor reciprocated": Reclaiming the Mercy in Qur'an 65:4

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ 

"In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful."

By the dawn of Islam’s classical age, the verses of the Qur’an had been meticulously unlocked by generations of scholars. Their tafsirs stood as monumental achievements of human intellect, mapping the divine word onto the complex terrain of human life. Yet, within this vast exegetical ocean, a single phrase in Surah al-Talaq—“wal-la’ī lam yaḥiḍn” (and those who have not menstruated)—became anchored to an interpretation that has echoed for over a millennium: that it sanctions the marriage and divorce of pre-pubescent girls.

This understanding, championed in the works of giants like Al-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi, and Ibn Kathir, has long been treated as a settled matter of Islamic law. It is a ruling built on a foundation of scholarly consensus, used to define the ‘iddah for a divorced child. But what if this entire edifice was constructed on a single, critically weak pillar? What if the pursuit of legal comprehensiveness led jurists to prioritize a marginal, human application over the Qur’an’s own primary, linguistic, and merciful intent?

This post undertakes an examination of Quran 65:4, not from a place of polemic or modern revisionism, but from within the deepest traditions of Islamic scholarship itself. We will apply the very tools the classical scholars revered—rigorous hadith criticism (ilm al-rijal), precise linguistic analysis, and the overarching legal principle of “lā ḍarar wa lā ḍirār” (no harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated)—to ask a question they seldom did: Does this interpretation align with the Qur’an’s own coherent voice, or does it create a contradiction that necessitates harm?

We will perform a forensic autopsy on the only evidence presented for the “child marriage” reading: the narration of Ubayy ibn Ka’b. We will trace its chain back to the mysterious narrator, `Amr ibn Salim, and discover why hadith masters like Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani declared him “majhul” (unknown) and his report “mursal” (broken). We will then watch as later jurists, in their drive to codify every possible scenario, transformed this weak report into definitive proof.

We will then return to the verse itself, to the word everyone overlooked: “in irtabtum” (if you are in doubt). We will demonstrate how this “doubt” is the master key that unlocks the verse’s true meaning—a meaning that makes perfect sense for an adult woman with a medical condition, but becomes nonsensical when applied to a healthy child. We will place the verse back into the flawless flow of Surah al-Talaq, showing how the chapter’s concern for adult housing, finances, and nursing collapses if a child is inserted into its core legal framework.

This is not an attack on the jurists, but a completion of their work. It is an appeal to the Qur’an’s own timeless mercy over the time-bound consensus of humans. It is the story of how a divine shield for vulnerable women was twisted into a sword against them, and how we, armed with the very scholarship of the past, can restore its original, just, and radiant meaning.

1. 🧩 PART I: THE PROBLEM & THE PROMISE

📜 The Established Narrative: The Classical Juristic Consensus

Within the classical tradition of Islamic law (Fiqh), the interpretation of Quran 65:4 has been overwhelmingly settled for over a millennium. The dominant position, as articulated by the great jurists (Fuqaha), is unambiguous:

The phrase "wal-la'ī lam yaḥiḍn" (وَٱلَّـٰٓـِٔى لَمْ يَحِضْنَ) is definitively understood to mean "young girls who have not yet reached menstruation."

This is not a marginal opinion. It is presented as a matter of Ijmaʿ (إجماع) – a binding scholarly consensus. This consensus is powerfully articulated by the renowned Hanbali jurist Muwaffaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī (d. 620/1223) in his monumental work of positive law, al-Mughnī, a text that remains a cornerstone of legal reasoning in jurisdictions like Saudi Arabia.

Ibn Qudāma's argument, which has become the classical blueprint, proceeds with a powerful, multi-sourced logic, 2 of them being chief among them:

1. The Authority of Consensus (Ijmaʿ): He begins by invoking the consensus claim of Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 318/930): "There is no difference of opinion concerning the prepubescent virgin (al-bikr al-ṣaghīra)." This immediately frames any dissent as being outside the accepted orthodoxy.

2. The Qur'anic Evidence (Q65:4): He then turns to the primary text, stating:

   "The words of Allah Most High, 'And for those who have not menstruated...' provide proof for the permissibility of marrying the young girl."

   The juristic logic is technical and legalistic: the verse legislates a waiting period ('Iddah) for such a girl after divorce. An 'Iddah presupposes a valid, consummated marriage. Therefore, the verse itself is seen as divine proof that the marriage and divorce of a pre-pubescent girl is a legally valid and anticipated scenario within Islamic law.

This classical position culminates in the legal doctrine of Wilāyat al-Ijbār (وِلَايَةُ الإِجْبَار)—the right of a father or guardian to compel his virgin daughter, whether mature or prepubescent, into a marriage with a suitable match (Kufūʾ), without requiring or, in the case of a child, even seeking her consent.

This is the formidable, centuries-old edifice we face: a ruling built on a claimed consensus, a specific reading of a Qur'anic verse, and the example of the Prophet himself.

🤔 The Modern Dilemma: A Clash of Consciences

For the contemporary Muslim, this classical interpretation creates an intense theological and moral crisis. It places the believer on the horns of a terrible dilemma:

• On one hand, there is a deep-seated reverence for the scholarly tradition and a commitment to the divine law as articulated by the Salaf (early generations).

• On the other hand, this ruling directly clashes with modern, evidence-based understandings of child development, psychology, and universal human rights.

As noted by scholar Carolyn Baugh, this is a global human rights issue. Organizations like UNICEF detail the devastating consequences of child marriage: higher rates of domestic and sexual violence, dangerous premature pregnancies, the denial of education, and the fundamental violation of a child's right to "free and full consent." A child cannot consent to a financial contract; how can they consent to the immense physical, emotional, and legal responsibilities of marriage?

The core conflict is this: How can a revelation from God, whose core principles are Justice (`Adl), Mercy (Raḥmah), and the removal of Harm (Ḍarar), be understood to sanction a practice that modern knowledge unequivocally demonstrates causes profound and lasting harm?

To simply dismiss the classical scholarship is to risk religious alienation. To blindly accept it is to risk moral complicity. This is the modern Muslim's quandary.

🎯 Our Thesis & Method: A Journey Back to the Source

This blog post will present a third path, one that does not require choosing between faith and ethics.

Our central thesis is this:

The classical "child marriage" interpretation of Quran 65:4 is not based on the strongest evidence from the Qur'an itself. It is a later juristic construct built primarily on a weak historical report and a specific legal methodology that prioritized comprehensiveness over contextual coherence. When we return to the Qur'an's own precise language, its internal logic, and the earliest layers of interpretation, a different, more merciful, and intellectually satisfying meaning emerges—one that aligns with the Qur'an's overarching spirit of justice.

Our method will be one of orthodox Islamic scholarship. We will not import external standards. We will use the classical tools of the Islamic sciences themselves to re-examine the evidence:

1. ʿIlm al-Tafsīr (The Science of Qur'anic Exegesis): We will perform a deep linguistic and contextual analysis of Surah al-Ṭalāq.

2. ʿIlm al-Ḥadīth (The Science of Prophetic Traditions): We will critically examine the chain of transmission (Isnād) of the key narration from Ubayy ibn Ka'b.

3. ʿIlm al-Rijāl (Biographical Evaluation): We will investigate the narrators in that chain, relying on the assessments of classical scholars like Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī.

4. Tracking Early Opinions (Āthār): We will highlight the interpretations of the earliest generation of scholars, the Tābiʿūn, such as Mujāhid ibn Jabr, to understand the primary meaning they derived from the verse.

We will demonstrate that the Qur'an's own words, when read holistically, provide a powerful, self-contained argument that Q65:4 is a merciful ruling for adult women with medical conditions, not a divine sanction for child marriage.

This is not an act of "reform" but of restoration—an attempt to clear away the dust of later juristic assumptions to reveal the brilliant, coherent, and timeless meaning of the Divine text. Let us begin.

2. 🔍 PART II: THE EVIDENCE ON TRIAL - DISMANTLING THE "SMOKING GUN"

The classical interpretation rests upon a single, critical piece of historical evidence: a narration attributed to the esteemed Companion Ubayy ibn Ka'b. This report is presented in the major exegeses (Tafsirs) as the definitive "cause of revelation" (Asbāb al-Nuzūl) for the verse, framing its meaning from the outset. It is the foundational pillar upon which the entire "child marriage" argument is constructed.

The narration, as cited by authorities like Ibn Kathir, Al-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi, Al-Suyuti, Al-Bayhaqi, and Al-Hakim, follows a consistent narrative:

Ubayy ibn Ka'b said to the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ): "O Messenger of God, there are categories of women whose waiting period has not been mentioned in the Book: THE YOUNG (al-ṣighār), THE OLD (al-kibār), and THE PREGNANT (ulāt al-aḥmāl)."

In response, God revealed the verse: "And for those who have ceased menstruation from your women - if you are in doubt - then their waiting period is three months, and [also for] those who have not menstruated. And for those who are pregnant, their term is that they lay down their burden..." (Quran 65:4)

At first glance, this appears to be a powerful and direct proof. The Companion himself, using the clear word "al-ṣighār" (the young), is asking about the ruling for children, and the verse is revealed as the answer. The logic seems unassailable.

🕵️‍♂️ A Forensic Autopsy of the Chain (Isnād)

In Islamic sciences, the content of a report (matn) is only as strong as its chain of transmission (isnād). We must subject this chain to rigorous, classical scrutiny. The consistent chain presented is:

Ibn Kathir/Al-Tabari/etc. ← ... ← Mutarrif ibn Ṭarif ← `Amr ibn Sālim ← Ubayy ibn Ka'b

The entire weight of this historically significant claim rests on the single, crucial link of `Amr ibn Sālim. He is the one claiming to have heard this directly from the Companion Ubayy ibn Ka'b. His reliability is, therefore, everything.

💥 The Fatal Flaw: The "Unknown" Narrator

When we consult the definitive classical works of narrator criticism (`Ilm al-Rijāl), we find a devastating verdict.

The most authoritative biographical dictionary, "Tahdhīb al-Kamāl fī Asmā' al-Rijāl" by Al-Mizzi, contains an entry for the only plausible candidate: Abū 'Uthmān al-Anṣārī, the Judge of Merv, whose name was `Amr ibn Sālim.

The entry reveals two catastrophic problems for the narration's reliability:

1. Profound Uncertainty About His Identity: Scholars were unsure of his most basic details. Al-Mizzi states:

   "Abū ‘Uthmān al-Anṣārī, from Medina, later [settled in] Khurasan, the judge of Marw. His name is ‘Amr ibn Sālim. It is also said: [Ibn Sulm], and it is said: [Ibn Sulaym], and it is said: [Ibn Sa‘d], and it is said his name is ‘Umar.

   Al-Ḥākim Abū Aḥmad said: "He is known by his kunya (surname), and I cannot ascertain anything definitive regarding his name and his father's name.'"

   This level of confusion is a major red flag in Hadith science. A narrator whose very name and lineage are this obscure cannot be considered a firmly established, primary-source authority.

2. The "Mursal" Bombshell: Most damningly, Al-Mizzi explicitly states:

   "He reported FROM Ubayy ibn Ka'b... MURSALAN."

   The designation "Mursal" (مُرْسَل) is a technical term of critical importance. It means the chain is BROKEN. A Tābi'i (successor) is narrating a statement directly from the Prophet (ﷺ) without naming the Companion who connected him to the Prophet. In this case, it means `Amr ibn Sālim did not hear this directly from Ubayy ibn Ka'b. There is an unknown, missing person in the chain.

This is not a minor weakness; it is a fatal flaw. A Mursal narration is classified as "Ḍa'īf" (Weak) and, according to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, cannot be used to establish definitive beliefs or legal rulings, especially ones that define the meaning of the Quran itself.

✅ The Unassailable Verdict

The conclusion is inescapable and built upon the very foundations of classical Islamic scholarship:

The primary external evidence used to justify the "child marriage" interpretation of Quran 65:4 is a WEAK (Ḍa'īf) narration with a BROKEN CHAIN (Mursal).

The pillar has crumbled. The "smoking gun" has been shown to be a replica. This does not mean the event never happened, but it means that from the perspective of rigorous, orthodox Islamic methodology, this report lacks the necessary authenticity to override the Quran's own clear language and internal coherence.

When the most reliable early sources, like the Tafsir of Mujāhid ibn Jabr (a student of Ibn `Abbās), are examined, they focus on the "doubt" in the verse pertaining to adult women's health issues, not children. The classical interpretation prioritized a later, weak report over the earliest and most linguistically sound understanding. With this weak narration set aside, the path is now clear to discover the verse's true, majestic meaning directly from the Quran itself.

3. 📖 PART III: THE QURAN'S OWN VOICE - RESTORING COHERENCE & MERCY

With the weak external narration set aside, we can now listen to the Quran's own voice, undistorted. What emerges is not a cryptic justification for a marginal practice, but a masterpiece of legal precision, linguistic beauty, and divine mercy that is utterly shattered by the "child marriage" interpretation. The Quran's internal coherence is one of its greatest miracles (I'jaz); any interpretation that breaks this coherence cannot be accepted.

The verse contains a phrase that serves as the ultimate litmus test for any interpretation: "In Irtabtum" (إِنِ ارْتَبْتُمْ) - "If you are in doubt." This is not a throwaway line; it is a precise, legal condition. We must ask: What is the nature of this "doubt" (irtiyāb)?

• The Logical Test (Applied to a Child): ❌
  Imagine a healthy, pre-pubescent girl. Her biological state is a known, natural, and expected fact. There is zero ambiguity. If she experiences her first bleeding, it is definitively her first period (menarche), a clear biological milestone. Applying the phrase "if you are in doubt" to her is logically redundant and nonsensical. It is like saying, "If you are in doubt whether this newborn is a baby..." The doubt has no object. This interpretation renders a divinely chosen word meaningless.

• The Perfect Fit (Applied to an Adult Woman): ✅
  Now, consider an adult woman of marriageable age who has never menstruated due to a medical condition like amenorrhea. If she suddenly experiences bleeding, a genuine and serious "doubt" arises. Is this her long-awaited first natural period? Or is it a sign of a serious health issue, disease, or dysfunctional uterine bleeding (istihādah)? This is a real clinical and legal doubt that requires resolution. The verse provides that resolution: a clear, three-month waiting period to ascertain her condition and protect her from slander. This fits perfectly.

This single word, "irtabtum," is a linguistic bomb that detonates the "child" interpretation. The Quran's choice of language is deliberate and wise; it explicitly describes a scenario of medical ambiguity in an adult woman, not the biological certainty of a child.

🧱 The Coherent List: A Symphony of Adult Biology

When we read Verse 4 within its immediate context, a perfectly structured, logical list emerges, detailing the 'iddah for women who fall outside the standard model mentioned in Verses 1-2 (women with regular periods). This list comprehensively covers all adult biological exceptions:

1. The Woman Whose Cycle Has ENDED: 👵

   • "Al-Lā'ī Ya'sin" (وَٱلَّـٰٓـِٔى يَئِسْنَ) - "Those who have ceased."

   • This is the menopausal woman. Her reproductive life has concluded.

2. The Woman Whose Cycle NEVER BEGAN: 👩‍⚕️

   • "Al-Lā'ī Lam Yaḥiḍn" (وَٱلَّـٰٓـِٔى لَمْ يَحِضْنَ) - "Those who have not menstruated."

   • This is the adult woman with primary amenorrhea. Her reproductive cycle, expected to have begun, is permanently absent due to a medical condition.

3. The Woman Whose Cycle Is PAUSED: 🤰

   • "Ulāt al-Aḥmāl" (وَأُولَـٰتُ ٱلْأَحْمَالِ) - "Those who are pregnant."

   • This is the pregnant woman. Her cycle is temporarily suspended.

This is a clinically precise and logically closed set. It covers every possible anomalous biological state for an adult woman of reproductive age. The list is about ABNORMALITIES, not stages of development.

🚫 The Fatal Category Error

Inserting a healthy, pre-pubescent child into this list is a profound category error. It is a logical and biological non-sequitur.

It is like inserting a "kindergartener" into a list of "retirees and people on long-term medical leave." The kindergartener's state is normal and temporary; the others' states are definitive and exceptional. The child does not belong in this category. Her "waiting period" is not needed for a divorce because the premise of her being in a consummated marriage is what creates the ethical and logical crisis in the first place.

🌊 The Shattered Flow of the Surah

The "child" interpretation doesn't just break Verse 4; it derails the entire chapter. Surah al-Ṭalāq is a tightly-woven legal discourse on adult divorce. Let's trace the flow that the "child" interpretation destroys:

• Verses 1-2: Establish the standard rules of divorce and reconciliation for adult, menstruating women.

• Verse 4: Provides exceptions for adult women with atypical biology (as shown above).

• Verses 5-7: Immediately return to practical, financial, and social regulations for adults:

  • "House them [in] where you dwell..." 🏠 (This presupposes an adult's household).

  • "If they are pregnant, then spend on them..." 🤰💰 (Addressing a pregnant woman).

  • "If they breastfeed for you, give them their payment..." 🤱 (Addressing a mother).

Placing a child as the subject of divorce in Verse 4 creates a jarring, nonsensical interruption in this seamless flow of adult responsibilities and realities. The chapter would lurch from adult law → child divorce → back to adult housing and nursing payments. This is not the coherent, majestic discourse of the Quran; it is an incoherent patchwork created by a flawed interpretation.

✅ The Unassailable Conclusion

The Quran, in its own self-contained and powerful voice, presents a merciful, coherent, and just ruling. It protects vulnerable adult women—the menopausal, the infertile, and the pregnant—by ensuring they have a clear, dignified legal status after divorce.

The "child marriage" interpretation:

• Renders a key Quranic word ("doubt") meaningless.

• Violates the logical structure of a precise, biological list.

• Introduces a catastrophic category error.

• Shatters the seamless narrative flow of the entire chapter.

A principle of Quranic interpretation is that the parts must make sense in light of the whole. An interpretation that creates internal contradiction and incoherence must be rejected. The Quran's own linguistic and structural power stands as the ultimate refutation of the classical claim. The verse is, and always was, a shield for women, not a sword against them.

4. 🧠 PART IV: THE COMPANIONS' FOCUS - SOLVING ADULT WOMEN'S REAL PROBLEMS

While the classical jurists developed the "child marriage" interpretation, the actual recorded legal opinions and rulings of the Prophet's Companions (Ṣaḥābah) reveal a fascinating and crucial distinction. Their focus was overwhelmingly on solving complex adult marital scenarios, particularly cases involving women whose menstrual cycles became irregular or stopped due to medical conditions.

Let's examine the explicit evidence from the most authoritative tafsirs.

🔍 Al-Ṭabarī's Testimony: The Focus on Adult "Doubt"

Al-Ṭabarī preserves the critical opinions of the earliest interpreters, the Tābi'ūn, who learned directly from the Companants. Their understanding of the "doubt" clause (إِنِ ارْتَبْتُمْ) centered entirely on adult women's health issues:

"وَقَالَ آخَرُونَ: مَعْنَى ذَلِكَ: إِنِ ارْتَبْتُمْ مِمَّا يَظْهَرُ مِنْهُنَّ مِنَ الدَّمِ، فَلَمْ تَدْرُوا أَدَمْ حَيْضٍ، أَمْ دَمْ مُسْتَحَاضَةٍ مِنْ كِبَرٍ كَانَ ذَلِكَ أَوْ عِلَّةٍ؟"

("And others said: The meaning of that is: 'If you are in doubt about the blood that appears from them, and you do not know: Is it menstrual blood or is it blood of istihāḍah (irregular bleeding) due to old age or illness?'")

• Source: This is attributed to 'Ikrimah (d. 723 CE) and Qatādah (d. 735 CE), elite students of the Companions.

• Significance: This interpretation of "doubt" only makes sense for adult women. A child's first period is not a "doubt"; it is a clear biological milestone. This shows the primary understanding of the verse was about adult medical conditions.

Furthermore, Al-Ṭabarī records the opinion of the great Tābi'ī Mujāhid ibn Jabr (d. 722 CE), the star student of Ibn 'Abbās:

"عَنْ مُجَاهِدٍ، قَوْلِهِ: ( إِنِ ارْتَبْتُمْ ) إِنْ لَمْ تَعْلَمُوا الَّتِي قَعَدَتْ عَنِ الْحَيْضَةِ، وَالَّتِي لَمْ تَحِضْ، فَعِدَّتُهُنَّ ثَلَاثَةُ أَشْهُرٍ."

("From Mujāhid, regarding His saying 'If you are in doubt': 'If you do not know [the ruling for] the one who has ceased menstruation and the one who has not menstruated, then their waiting period is three months.'")

• Significance: Mujāhid, a primary link to the Companions' understanding, focuses on the lack of knowledge about the legal ruling, not about applying it to children. The "one who has not menstruated" is presented as a parallel legal category to the menopausal woman, which logically points to an adult with a medical condition (amenorrhea).

📜 Al-Baghawī's Crucial Evidence: The "Third Category" Woman

Al-Baghawī provides what is perhaps the most devastating evidence against the "child" interpretation being the primary focus. He documents the complex rulings developed by the leading Companions for a specific case that didn't fit the simple categories of 65:4:

"أَمَّا الشَّابَةُ الَّتِي كَانَتْ تَحِيضُ فَارْتَفَعَ حَيْضُهَا قَبْلَ بُلُوغِهَا سَنَّ الْآئِسَاتِ : فَذَهَبَ أَكْثَرُ أَهْلِ الْعِلْمِ إِلَى أَنَّ عِدَّتَهَا لَا تَنْقَضِي حَتَّى يُعَاوِدَهَا الدَّمُ فَتَعْتَدَّ بِثَلَاثَةِ أَقْرَاءٍ أَوْ تَبْلُغَ سِنَّ الْآئِسَاتِ فَتَعْتَدَّ بِثَلَاثَةِ أَشْهُرٍ . وَهُوَ قَوْلُ عُثْمَانَ وَعَلِيٍّ وَزَيْدِ بْنِ ثَابِتٍ وَعَبْدِ اللَّهِ بْنِ مَسْعُودٍ"

("As for the young woman (Al-Shābbah) who used to menstruate, but then her period stopped before reaching the age of menopausal women: the majority of the people of knowledge have gone to the opinion that her waiting period does not end until the blood returns to her, so she observes the waiting period with three cycles, OR she reaches the age of menopausal women, so she observes the waiting period with three months. And this is the saying of 'Uthmān, 'Alī, Zayd ibn Thābit, and 'Abdullāh ibn Mas'ūd.")

Let's analyze the monumental significance of this passage:

1. The Subject is an ADULT: The subject is explicitly called "Al-Shābbah"—a young/prime-aged woman, not a child (Ṣaghīrah). She is an adult who has lost her period due to illness or stress.

2. She is a "THIRD CATEGORY": This woman does NOT fit the simple 3-month rule of 65:4. Why? Because her condition is one of DOUBT—she used to menstruate. The Companions had to create a new, more complex ruling just for her.

3. The Elite Companions' Focus: The highest-ranking Companions—the Caliphs 'Uthmān and 'Alī, along with Zayd ibn Thābit (the Quran's scribe) and Ibn Mas'ūd—were personally occupied with solving the 'iddah for this ADULT woman in medical limbo.

This proves that the pressing, real-world issue for the earliest Muslim authorities was protecting ADULT women with irregular cycles, not legislating for children.

The simplistic 3-month rule was for clear-cut cases (permanent menopause or permanent amenorrhea). The complex case of the Shābbah required the best legal minds. If the primary intent of 65:4 was to provide for child marriage, why didn't these Companions simply apply its 3-month rule to this adult woman? Because they understood the verse had a narrower, more specific application.

⚖️ Ibn Kathir & The Case of Subay'ah al-Aslamiyyah

Ibn Kathir, while asserting the "child" interpretation, spends a significant portion of his commentary on 65:4 detailing the famous case of Subay'ah bint al-Ḥārith al-Aslamiyyah.

• The Scenario: Subay'ah's husband died. She was pregnant. She gave birth shortly after his death. Then, she wanted to remarry.

• The Controversy: A man named Abū al-Sanābil told her she was not allowed to marry until she had completed the 'iddah for a widow: four months and ten days.

• The Prophetic Ruling: Subay'ah went to the Prophet ﷺ. He told her that Abū al-Sanābil was wrong. He ruled that her 'iddah was over the moment she gave birth, and he commanded her to get married if she wished.

This story is cited by Ibn Kathir (and others) to show that the phrase "وَأُوْلَاتُ ٱلْأَحْمَالِ أَجَلُهُنَّ أَن يَضَعْنَ حَمْلَهُنَّ" ("and for those who are pregnant, their term is when they deliver") applies to widows as well as divorced women.

It demonstrates that the early community, including Companions like Ibn Mas'ūd, were engaged in sophisticated legal debates about adult women's 'iddah. The chapter's context is saturated with discussions about the rights and responsibilities of adult women—widows, divorced women, and pregnant women. Inserting a child into this discourse is a contextual anomaly.

✅ The Inescapable Conclusion from the Companions' Rulings

The recorded legal efforts of the elite Companions point overwhelmingly in one direction:

• Their intellectual energy was spent on complex fiqh for adult women.

• They were solving real-world problems like the 'iddah of the Shābbah (the adult woman whose period stopped) and the pregnant widow.

• The "doubt" (irtiyāb) they discussed was a clinical, medical doubt about an adult woman's cycle, not a vague uncertainty.

5. 🏛️ PART V: THE HISTORICAL HIJACK - HOW DID THIS HAPPEN?

To understand how the interpretation of Quran 65:4 became so firmly entrenched, we must step into the minds of the classical jurists (al-Fuqahāʾ). They were not villains; they were brilliant legal architects operating within a specific historical and intellectual context. Their conclusions were the product of a complex interplay of methodology, culture, and a sincere desire to build a comprehensive divine law.

The primary mission of the Fuqahāʾ was to extrapolate from the foundational texts—the Quran and the Sunnah—a complete, functioning legal system (Shari'ah) capable of addressing every possible scenario a Muslim community might face. This led to a subtle but profound shift in their primary question.

They moved from the exegetical question:

"What is the primary, contextual meaning of God's words in this verse?"

To the juristic question:

"What are all the potential real-world legal cases to which this verse's ruling could technically be applied?"

This is the "Legal Loophole" Mindset. When they read Quran 65:4, they saw a ruling for women "who have not menstruated." Their legal duty, as they saw it, was to identify every category that fits this description. Their list looked like this:

1. The Primary, Obvious Category: An adult woman with amenorrhea (a medical condition where she has never menstruated). 👩‍⚕️

2. The Technical, Marginal Category: A healthy, pre-pubescent girl. 👶

Once the child was identified as a technical fit for the phrase "lam yaḥiḍn", the juristic engine engaged. They reasoned: If the Quran provides a ruling for her 'Iddah (waiting period), then a valid, consummated marriage with her must be a legally anticipated scenario. The 'Iddah is the effect; the marriage is the cause. In their drive for legal comprehensiveness, a marginal potential application was transformed into a foundational legal proof.

🏺 The Weight of the Ancient Patriarchy: A Near Eastern Milieu

The jurists did not operate in a vacuum. They were products of a Near Eastern milieu where child marriage was a deeply embedded social norm, practiced for centuries by the Roman, Persian, and Jewish civilizations that preceded and surrounded them.

As documented by scholars like Carolyn Baugh, this was a world where:

• In Roman Law, the minimum age for girls was set at 12, with elite families often marrying daughters as young as 11 (e.g., Octavia, daughter of Emperor Claudius). The motivation, as the Greek historian Plutarch noted, was a desire for "an unformed character and an untouched body."

• In Jewish Halakha, a father had the absolute right to marry off his minor daughter without her consent. The Talmudic era saw debates, but the prevailing practice, especially in times of uncertainty, was early marriage to secure a daughter's future.

• In Sasanian Persia, civil law permitted marriage at age nine, with consummation expected by age twelve.

The common threads across these empires were paternal authority, political alliance, economic consolidation, and the control of female sexuality. In this world, a daughter was often seen as a legal and economic asset under the dominion of her father (Wilāyah).

The early Muslim jurists, seeking to build a legal system for their society, inevitably absorbed these cultural assumptions. When they looked at the Quranic text, they did so through this pre-existing patriarchal lens. The social reality of child marriage was a "given"; their task was to find its divine regulation, not necessarily to question its underlying premise. They were, in a sense, projecting their cultural reality onto the text.

🔄 The Circular Logic & The Fortress of "Consensus" (Ijmāʿ)

This is where the classical argument becomes a self-reinforcing loop. The most powerful expression of this is found in the work of Ibn al-Mundhir (d. 318/930) and, later, Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223).

Ibn al-Mundhir, in his book of consensus, writes with definitive authority:

٣٥٠ - وَأَجْمَعُوا أَنَّ نِكَاحَ الْأَبِ ابْنَتَهُ الصَّغِيرَةَ الْبِكْرَ جَائِزٌ إِذَا زَوَّجَهَا مِنْ كُفْء.

"They have consensus that a father's marriage of his young, virgin daughter is permissible, if he marries her to a suitable match."

This statement is a masterpiece of juristic compression. It seamlessly merges the concept of the compelling guardian (Al-Walī al-Mujbir), the status of the pre-pubescent virgin (Al-Ṣaghīrah al-Bikr), and the requirement of suitability (Kafā'ah). By attributing it to Ijmāʿ, it becomes a theological fortress. To disagree is not just to have a different opinion; it is to stand against the unified voice of the early Muslim community, a grave sin.

Ibn Qudāma then builds his case in Al-Mughnī, using a circular logic that became the standard blueprint:

1. He invokes Ibn al-Mundhir's Consensus first, establishing the permissibility of the practice as a foregone conclusion.

2. He then uses Quran 65:4 as proof: He states, "The words of Allah... provide proof for the permissibility of marrying the young girl," because the verse legislates her 'Iddah. The 'Iddah proves the marriage; the marriage justifies the application of the verse.

Critically, Ibn Qudāma's initial evidence includes only the names of later scholars (Tābi'ūn like Sa'īd ibn al-Musayyib, Al-Ḥasan, Mujāhid, etc.). The foundational evidence from the Prophet's own Companions is conspicuously absent at this stage, being replaced by the later, derived consensus.

This creates a perfect, self-justifying circle:

• The Practice (child marriage) is used to define the Meaning of the Quranic verse.

• The Meaning of the Quranic verse is then used to justify the Practice.

• This interpretation is then sealed with the authority of Ijmāʿ, making it virtually unassailable within the traditional framework.

The jurists, with the best of intentions to be thorough and faithful, had constructed a theological feedback loop. A ruling built on a weak historical narration and a specific legal methodology became, through repetition and the powerful claim of consensus, the "obvious" and "only" meaning of the divine text for over a millennium. Our task is not to condemn them, but to understand this process and, with the tools they themselves developed, return to the Quran's own pristine and coherent voice.

6. ✅ PART VI: THE RESTORATION - THE QURAN'S MERCY REVEALED

The journey through history, linguistics, and jurisprudence is complete. The verdict is clear.

• The Evidence for the "Child" Interpretation is WEAK. It rests on a single, broken narration (`Amr ibn Salim's Mursal report) that cannot bear the weight of defining a Quranic verse.

• The Linguistics are COHERENT for Adults. The "doubt" clause (in irtabtum) is meaningless for a child's natural state and perfectly logical for adult women with medical conditions.

• The Chapter's Flow is LOGICAL for Adults. Surah al-Talaq, from start to finish, is a coherent legal manual addressing the realities of adult divorce, housing, and finances.

Freed from the constraints of a later juristic imposition, the verse reveals its true, majestic purpose:

Quran 65:4 is a Divine Safety Net. It ensures that EVERY adult woman—regardless of her biological circumstance—has a clear, dignified, and finite legal path out of marriage and back into society. It is a verse of profound mercy (Raḥmah) and justice (Adl) for:

• The Older Woman 👵 whose cycles have ended (Menopause).

• The Medically Vulnerable Woman 👩‍⚕️ whose cycles never began (Amenorrhea).

• The Pregnant Woman 🤰 whose cycle is paused.

It is a comprehensive, compassionate closure to the law of Iddah, leaving no believing woman in a legal limbo.

⚖️ Upholding the Prophetic Principle: "Lā Ḍarar" - No Harm Shall Be Inflicted

This restored interpretation directly fulfills one of the highest principles of Islamic law, a maxim established by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ himself:

لَا ضَرَرَ وَلَا ضِرَارَ

"There shall be no harm inflicted nor reciprocated."

(Sunan Ibn Mājah 2340)

The classical interpretation, by justifying a practice now proven by modern science and human rights standards to cause severe and lasting physical and psychological harm (Ḍarar) to children, fundamentally violates this core Prophetic command. Our interpretation aligns Islamic law with its own highest ethical objective: the elimination of harm.

The most devastating blow to the classical position is that it creates a direct contradiction with the unequivocal teachings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ himself. The doctrine of the compelling guardian (Al-Walī al-Mujbir) and the marriage of children without consent is annulled by the living Sunnah.

1. The Prophet Gave Women the Final Say Over Their Marriages

The Prophet ﷺ explicitly established that a woman's consent is the foundation of a valid marriage, whether she is a virgin or previously married.

عَنْ أَبِي هُرَيْرَةَ قَالَ قَالَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ: لَا تُنْكَحُ الْأَيِّمُ حَتَّى تُسْتَأْمَرَ وَلَا تُنْكَحُ الْبِكْرُ حَتَّى تُسْتَأْذَنَ قَالُوا يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ وَكَيْفَ إِذْنُهَا قَالَ أَنْ تَسْكُتَ

Abu Huraira reported: The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said, "A previously married woman shall not be married until she is consulted, and a virgin shall not be married until her permission is sought." They said, "O Messenger of Allah, how does she give her permission?" He said, "By her silence."

(Sahih al-Bukhari 5136)

This hadith dismantles the idea of compulsion. The Prophet ﷺ was so committed to this principle that he even defined the shy, affirmative consent of a virgin.

عَنْ عَائِشَةَ قَالَتْ قُلْتُ يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ يُسْتَأْمَرُ النِّسَاءُ فِي أَبْضَاعِهِنَّ قَالَ نَعَمْ قُلْتُ فَإِنَّ الْبِكْرَ تُسْتَأْمَرُ فَتَسْتَحْيِي فَتَسْكُتُ قَالَ سُكَاتُهَا إِذْنُهَا

Aisha said: "I said, 'O Messenger of Allah, are women to be consulted regarding their marriage?' He said, 'Yes.' I said, 'Indeed, the virgin is consulted, and she is too shy to speak.' He said, 'Her silence is her permission.'"

(Sahih al-Bukhari 5137)

2. The Prophet Annulled Forced Marriages

The Prophet ﷺ did not just preach this principle; he enforced it, personally intervening to annul marriages where a woman's consent had been violated.

عَنْ خَنْسَاءَ بِنْتِ خِذَامٍ الْأَنْصَارِيَّةِ أَنَّ أَبَاهَا زَوَّجَهَا وَهْيَ ثَيِّبٌ فَكَرِهَتْ ذَلِكَ فَأَتَتْ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَرَدَّ نِكَاحَهُ

Khawla bint Tha'labah said: "Her father married her off while she was a previously married woman, and she disliked that. So she went to the Messenger of Allah ﷺ, and he annulled the marriage."

(Sahih al-Bukhari 5138)

عَنْ ‌عَائِشَةَ أَنَّ فَتَاةً دَخَلَتْ عَلَيْهَا فَقَالَتْ إِنَّ أَبِي زَوَّجَنِي ابْنَ أَخِيهِ لِيَرْفَعَ بِي خَسِيسَتَهُ وَأَنَا كَارِهَةٌ قَالَتِ اجْلِسِي حَتَّى يَأْتِيَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَجَاءَ رَسُولُ اللهِ صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَأَخْبَرَتْهُ فَأَرْسَلَ إِلَى أَبِيهَا فَدَعَاهُ فَجَعَلَ الْأَمْرَ إِلَيْهَا فَقَالَتْ يَا رَسُولَ اللهِ، قَدْ أَجَزْتُ مَا صَنَعَ أَبِي وَلَكِنْ أَرَدْتُ أَنْ أَعْلَمَ أَلِلنِّسَاءِ مِنَ الْأَمْرِ شَيْءٌ

Aisha reported: "A young woman came to her and said, 'My father married me to his brother's son so that he might raise his own status, and I was unwilling.' Aisha said, 'Sit here until the Prophet ﷺ comes.' When the Messenger of Allah ﷺ came, she informed him. He sent for her father and summoned him, and he gave the choice to her. She said, 'O Messenger of Allah, I have approved what my father did, but I wanted to know whether women have any right in this matter.'"

(Sunan al-Nasa'i 3267)

This is a canonical story of a woman being used as a transactional object. The Prophet's ﷺ response was not to uphold the father's right of Ijbār; it was to immediately give the choice (al-Khiyār) to the woman, invalidating the forced contract.

🏁 The Unassailable Convergence of Evidence

This restoration is not built on a single argument. It is built on a convergence of evidence from every possible angle, all pointing to the same, merciful truth, as we have seen in our previous post on the true age of A'isha Bint Abi Bakr, down below.

Evidence Category	The Evidence 🧱	What It Proves 🎯
🏛️ Historical & Mathematical	The Asma' Chronology: Public death at 100 in 73 AH. A 10-year age gap.	Forces Aisha's birth to 605 CE & her marriage age to ~18. This is public, caliphate-level math.
💪 Biological & Logistical	The Battle of Uhud: Carrying heavy water skins repeatedly under battle conditions.	A physiological impossibility for an 11-year-old. Perfectly feasible for a strong 19-year-old woman.
🗣️ Social & Cultural	Addressing Fatima as "O my daughter" and Anas/Abu Sa'id as "young boys."	Socially coherent only if she was older. Culturally bizarre if she was younger.
📜 Early Testimony	Ibn Ishaq's list of earliest converts, describing her as a "small child" around 610 CE.	Historically impossible if born in 614 CE. Only works if born before the Revelation (605 CE).
🔤 Linguistic & Textual	Ibn Manzur's Lisan al-Arab: "Sitt" (6) as a metaphor for a "foundational period" and "Tis'a" (9) for "completion/readiness."	Provides the mechanism for misunderstanding: Aisha's poetic description of life stages was transcribed as literal numbers.
⚖️ Legal & Ethical	The Prophet's annulment of forced marriages and his command to seek female consent.	The doctrine of Walī Mujbir contradicts the living Sunnah of the Prophet ﷺ.
➡️ The "Age 9" Narrative's Fatal Flaw	It stands alone, contradicted by every other category of verifiable evidence.	It requires us to believe the entire Muslim community forgot Asma's famous age, that Aisha performed superhuman feats, and that the Prophet's own actions against forced marriage were irrelevant. This is the truly incoherent position.

The choice before us is clear.

We can choose an interpretation built on a weak narration that leads to contradicting the Prophet's own Sunnah and violating the core Islamic principle of "Lā Ḍarar" (No Harm).

Or, we can choose the interpretation built on the Quran's own coherent language, its logical flow, and the Prophet's living example of justice and consent. This interpretation upholds the mercy, wisdom, and timeless justice of the Divine Law.

The Quran's mercy has been revealed. It is now our duty to uphold it.

7. 🏁 CONCLUSION: THE PATH FORWARD

Our journey through the linguistics, history, and jurisprudence of Quran 65:4 has reached its end. We have followed the evidence where it leads, using the classical tools of Islamic scholarship itself. The conclusion is clear and liberating.

We are not "Reformers." We are "Restorationists."

We have not sought to change a single word of the Divine Text. Our work has been one of cleaning—meticulously wiping away the dust of centuries, the layers of well-intentioned but flawed human jurisprudence, and the heavy weight of patriarchal cultural assumptions. Beneath it all, we have found the verse's original, brilliant meaning: a merciful, coherent, and just ruling designed to protect adult women with medical conditions, not a cryptic sanction for harm. We have restored the Quran's own voice.

A Call to Intellectual Courage

We can and must hold two truths at once:

1. To RESPECT the classical jurists as giants upon whose shoulders we stand, acknowledging their monumental effort in building Islamic law.

2. To ACKNOWLEDGE their humanity, their historical context, and the undeniable fact that they, like all humans, were susceptible to projecting their cultural norms onto the divine revelation.

True respect for tradition is not blind imitation (Taqlīd). It is to honor the spirit of their intellectual struggle (Ijtihād) by continuing it—by using our God-given reason to ensure that our understanding of God's law aligns with His ultimate, stated objectives.

The Final Word: Justice and Mercy Unleashed

The Quran's message is not one of legalistic loopholes, but of transcendent moral principles. It commands us:

إِنَّ اللَّهَ يَأْمُرُ بِالْعَدْلِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ...

"Indeed, God commands justice and excellence..." (Quran, Al-Naḥl, 16:90)

قُلْ أَمَرَ رَبِّى بِٱلْقِسْطِ ۖ

"Say: 'My Lord has commanded justice...'" (Quran, Al-Aʿrāf, 7:29)

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَاكَ إِلَّا رَحْمَةً لِّلْعَالَمِينَ

"And We have not sent you [O Prophet] except as a mercy to the worlds." (Quran, Al-Anbiyāʾ, 21:107)

These are not secondary themes; they are the very essence of the Islamic revelation. An interpretation of any verse that leads to injustice, demonstrable harm, and a betrayal of mercy has failed to capture the spirit of the Quran, regardless of how many centuries it has been repeated.

By returning to the primary, linguistically sound, and contextually coherent meaning of Quran 65:4, we do not change the Quran. We set it free. We allow its inherent justice and mercy to shine forth, untarnished and radiant, as a guide for our time and all times.

The Quran was, is, and always will be a "guidance for the righteous" (Quran, Al-Baqarah, 2:2). Let us have the courage to read it as such.

THE END

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